More important is the chief executive's perception. President Lee has repeatedly said that inter-Korean relations and unification must be handled from an international perspective as well as from a national outlook. That is the logic the Foreign Ministry has stressed in the past decade. In addition, a number of former diplomats have been given important posts in the new government. Han Seung-soo, a former ambassador to the U.S. and foreign minister, has become prime minister, and three career diplomats have been named ministers or occupy ministerial posts -- a situation diametrically opposed to the past 10 years, when unification ministers swayed the foreign affairs-security teams. It could well be dubbed "the spring of the Foreign Ministry."

The term “spring” itself hints at a deformed reality. Leadership competition is bound to occur among ministries dealing with diplomacy and security in any country. In the U.S., for example, there is always internal contest between the National Security Council and the Department of State or between the State and Defense Departments. They are over the initiative in visions and policies, however. They are of a different dimension from the internal ideological squabbles we had in the past decade.

Our diplomacy and security issues in the last 10 years offered a battlefield for ideological conflict. These were zero-sum games between pro- and anti-American groups and groups supporting or opposing the Sunshine Policy. The typical case was the confrontation between the so-called "independence faction" and "alliance faction" that resulted in the resignation of foreign minister Yoon Young-hwan in January 2004. Touched off by a complaint filed by the Foreign Ministry, the incident led to a review of the entire North America policy by Cheong Wa Dae. The reason the presidential office gave in holding the North America policy line responsible was remarkable. The Foreign Ministry, it said, fails to understand the basic spirit and direction of the new independent diplomacy. This announcement, criticizing a Foreign Ministry that was inclined to the U.S., indicates how ignorant the then administration was about diplomacy.

The framework of foreign affairs and security has also changed. The new administration puts priority on restoring our alliance with America. It no longer takes great courage to emphasize the Seoul-Washington alliance. The alliance distorted by the previous administrations is beginning to be normalized. And so it should be. Nevertheless, frankly speaking, I am often led to pay attention to the Unification Ministry and the inter-Korean issue. The Unification Ministry already met a crisis of abolition before the new administration was launched. With the alliance dominating the Korean issue and universality at the forefront, the voice of the Unification Ministry has all but faded.

If we keep the ministry as an important pillar in our diplomacy and security but ignore the expertise it has accumulated as a reaction to the wrongs done in the past decade, it is a national loss. The expertise and information on North Korea the ministry has are an important competitive edge we have in the inter-Korean issue. The way to genuinely restore our diplomacy and security sector is to conduct a “plus-sum” game where the alliance and inter-Korean relations, and the foreign and unification ministries, compete and cooperate. The spring of the Foreign Ministry should not be allowed to become the winter of the Unification Ministry.

This column was contributed by Park Doo-sik from the Chosun Ilbo's National/Politics News Desk.