Lee's camp seems to be more interested in North Korea's New Year editorial than in the failure to meet the deadline. Pyongyang had railed against Lee and the Grand National Party right up election day, but it made no reference whatsoever in the New Year editorial on Lee and the GNP. Welcoming the fact, Joo Ho-young, the spokesman for the president-elect, said, "We feel North Korea has formally acknowledged as fait accompli the election of candidate Lee as president."

While a candidate, Lee was criticized for the small difference with the ruling camp as far as North Korea is concerned. Some questioned where he stood -- so much so that the breakaway candidate Lee Hoi-chang justified his late entry into the presidential race with Lee Myung-bak's opaque position. During the election campaign, Lee Hoi-chang assailed that aspect harshly. President-elect Lee's North Korea policy line was conciliatory, if you like him, and wishy-washy if you don’t. Lee himself may ascribe that to his liberal philosophy, but some commentators accused him of being a populist surrounded by doves and excessively conscious of middle-of-the-road voters.

In that case, of course he cannot be firm on Pyongyang's violation of the deadline and must be encouraged by the North's multi-purpose New Year editorial. He seems to harbor little fear of North Korea's nuclear programs. Perhaps he entertains a naive fantasy that he can persuade Pyongyang if he applies the dialogue and persuasion formula which, as Seoul mayor, served him well in persuading traders to make way for the Cheonggye Stream restoration.

But the situation won't be that easy. The North is not as easy to deal with as he thinks. The North Korean authorities, with little in hand, have displayed the boldness and dexterity to play games with the superpower America and friendly China. They are cunning and intrepid, pretending innocence a while before the deadline, after taking everything they could, by saying, the delay of energy aid leaves them “no choice” but to “adjust the speed” of disabling the nuclear facilities.

That was not the end of its trickery. The New Year’s editorial, in short, was a decoy intended to test president-elect Lee. Without provoking Lee, they are sounding out whether the South will continue providing them with economic assistance. It's a call for continued aid on the condition of no provocation. In other words, the editorial hints at what will happen when economic aid is suspended. Coincidentally, some pro-Pyongyang academics and commentators have apparently started influencing public opinion in favor of the Lee administration continuing the current free handouts policy regardless of whether the North disables its nuclear facilities and weapons as a sort of payment for guarantees of peace and co-existence.

The president-elect must not be swayed by them. Influenced by his 80 percent approval ratings and over 50 percent public support for continued aid to the North, Lee has yet to take a firm position toward the Kim Jong-il force.

Lee may also be lulled by overwhelming support in recent opinion polls for his program to restore the economy. Let us hope he isn’t motivated by arrogance -- to adapt President Roh Moo-hyun’s favorite line, "If the economy is fine, we have nothing to worry about even if we bungle everything else." Economic issues can be remedied even if it takes time and produces some negative effects. But inter-Korean problems, once the wrong step is taken, cannot be remedied.

The bigger problem is that he is losing out in strategy and tactics against Kim Jong-il. The North's New Year editorial was tactical. Every word in it was a test of the South Korean authorities.

Lee should seize the opportunity. He needs to tell the North that he is different from his predecessor, and this non-compliance with the deadline is unacceptable. Unless he resists the North's bad habit of bullying and intimidating the South now, it will remain a headache throughout his tenure. This is exactly what Kim Jong-il aims at. In short, Lee should have dealt firmly with the violation of the deadline. He should have realized that what's important in games with Pyongyang is less the content of a sincere declaration but punctiliousness in adhering to the agreed procedures. His response suggests he is unable to grasp the situation.

They must be laughing up North. We in turn sigh at the prospect of being dragged round by the nose under the Lee administration just as we were under the Roh government. Lee should be aware that a firm response to the North without being befuddled by their antics is the only way to truly help the North and lead it to reconciliation. All South Korean leaders were conciliatory toward the North in the past 10-odd years, advocating persuasion, dialogue and trust, but the situation has not improved. As far as inter-Korean policy is concerned, Lee is no different from them.