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What other reckless actions can we expect from the president during what are effectively the last two months of his tenure? Not a man resigned to his fate as a lame duck, he will play every last one of his remaining cards. The remarks he has made and the things he has done since returning from Pyongyang suggest he has thrown all caution overboard when it comes inter-Korean issues and national security. Which country's president is he? He went so far as to say the country would be ¡°ruined" if it followed the advice of a certain presidential contender. Is that something a president should say about his country?
Many are fed up with President Roh Moo-hyun. Many have talked to him as much as they could, attempting to persuade and advise him with good sense. But he didn¡¯t care. He regarded all criticism of him as malicious and everyone critical of him as the enemy. And he closed his heart and mind as if to say, "I'll go my own way."
Some say there is no need to pay him any more attention. It doesn¡¯t matter how much noise he makes, they reason, he only has two months left in office. But that isn¡¯t true: he is capable of anything, even until a few days before he retires. Such a person cannot be judged with common sense. He behaves as if the less interested people are in him, the more he needs to prove he exists.
The problem is his policy toward North Korea. Other matters can be repaired by the next administration, but our national security and defense and our relationship with the U.S. and North Korea are in irreversible trouble once he takes action. We cannot afford to overlook his view that we need ¡°three- or four-party talks¡± on a peace declaration, a vicious cycle of so-called inter-Korean economic cooperation, concessions on the Northern Limit Line (Korea's de facto sea boarder along the west coast), and the end of any attempt to persuade the North to reform and open up. Cheong Wa Dae is set to summon the business leaders who accompanied him to Pyongyang on Tuesday in a bid to more or less force them to offer "gifts" of economic cooperation. That in itself is a decisive step.
Is there no way to stop it? Roh, a so-called legal expert, bragged after a review, "My successor will have to honor a bill I issue even on the last day of my term." Does that mean that we have no way at all of bouncing any check he issues? We will have to drop the common sense our distinguished ancestors and scholars taught. Had they been applicable, he wouldn't have come this far. To a man who takes pleasure in frustrating the designs of others, common sense does not apply.
But neither can we stand idly by. Some suggest impeachment, but we have neither time to do so nor is the legislature in a position to take such extreme measures. It would suit Roh, who enjoys games of contrary ideas. Still, the way to stop him in the current circumstances lies in the National Assembly. It is for the ruling and opposition parties to discuss the matter and submit a resolution to ignore the Roh administration¡¯s attempts to railroad through any bills on North Korea, national security and economic cooperation and let the next administration and president handle them.
Since the issues Roh is pushing are not urgent and leave plenty of room in the details of implementation, it's only reasonable to let the next administration deal with them. If the ruling camp picks a single presidential candidate, policy consistency and continuity will be ensured and the ideology of a new president carved out more clearly. There is no reason to concede such a precious opportunity to the incumbent, whose power is all but used up. And in the event the opposition takes power, the matters in question will be open to reconsideration. Here lies a chance for bipartisan agreement.
If the ruling and opposition presidential candidates agree, the National Assembly would be able to produce a resolution calling to leave specifics of the inter-Korean joint declaration to the next administration. And the voters will judge the outcome in the December presidential election and the April general elections. We cannot leave the task of handling the basic framework of inter-Korean issues to a soon-to-retire chief executive as a sacrifice to his desire to accomplish things or satisfy his populist instincts.
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