The first attempt was the July 4, 1972 South-North joint communiqué. The joint communiqué was adopted while the director of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hu-rak, visited Pyongyang; the memory of the 1968 Cheong Wa Dae raid in which 31 North Korean commandos attempted to kill president Park Chung-hee was still vivid, and many were shocked when the statement proclaimed the North’s three unification principles of self-reliance, peace and national unity.

It did not take long for the two Koreas to awaken from the dream of overcoming national division: before the year was out, the South and North had to face the reality that the self-reliance, peace and national unity they each envisaged were entirely different.

In 1992, amid the post-Cold-War global shift, the two sides adopted a Basic Agreement and declaration on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That effort came to naught in the face of the first North Korean nuclear crisis. The third attempt was the June 15, 2000 inter-Korean summit and joint declaration. Despite expanded exchanges and cooperation, however, it was powerless to stop the North from testing a nuclear device.

Will the second inter-Korean summit, the fourth attempt, prove a homerun as expected or turn out to be a high flying ball? Let's review briefly the declaration the two heads of state agreed on Thursday.

The core of the Oct. 4 declaration, more specific than the June 15 one, is peace and mutual prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Peace items consist of inter-Korean cooperation to ease tensions and guarantee peace and international cooperation for the establishment of a peace framework.

Much as the inter-Korean non-aggression pact contained in the Basic Agreement of the 1990s was buried because of the nuclear crisis, enforcement of the new accord is also difficult without a resolute decision on the part of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to abandon nuclear arms -- because there is no chance the U.S. will start improving its relations with North Korea in earnest despite the efforts of six-nation talks unless North Korea abolishes its nuclear development programs in both name and reality.

If the items concerning mutual prosperity -- including the establishment of a special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea -- are to contribute to overcoming the economic crisis North Korea confronts, the key is serious cooperation based on reform and opening in the North beyond the Songun or military-first ideology. Accordingly, the success or failure of the Oct. 4 declaration depends more on how boldly the North resolves its nuclear problem and embarks on the path of peace and common prosperity than on the efforts of the South or the international community.

The most important remarks Roh made during his visit to Pyongyang were to his entourage at lunch in the wake of his first face-to-face meeting with Kim. He told them he had confirmed Kim's firm will for peace but felt there remained a wall that was difficult to break through. He noted something important when he said, "I felt a sense of distrust and rejection of the terms of reform and opening” during his meeting with both the president of the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Yong-nam, on Tuesday and in his meeting with Kim Jong-il on Wednesday. This notion is the part of the second inter-Korean summit that warrants most attention.

If Roh felt it to the extent of putting himself in the other's shoes, the prospects are dim for the time being that the Kim Jong-il regime will move on from military-first politics to reform and opening. So long as Kim does not assume a more positive posture toward reform and opening, it's difficult to expect the virtuous cycle Roh emphasized in his dinner speech on the second day of his visit. That is true for two reasons: because economic cooperation devoid of reform and opening cannot overcome the North's economic crisis, and because the North Korean leadership will avoid serious economic cooperation for fear of the damaging effect it could have on system stability.

The tasks left by the summit are evident. The virtuous cycle of peace and prosperity Roh hopes for depends on how to solve the last remaining difficult task of getting rid of the North's military-first ideology following post-Cold-War shifts in world history and the democratization of South Korea. The summit revealed that North Korea has yet to find an answer to the problem, even if the keys are already at hand. The first key is the resolution of the nuclear issue, and the second is reform and opening. The next inter-Korean summit will have to make the utmost efforts so that the North can work the two out.

This column was contributed by Ha Young-sun, a professor of International Relations at Seoul National University.