Even among Asia specialists, there is likely more attention being paid to this week’s six-party talks meeting in Beijing, than to questions of whether President Roh Moo-hyun will walk across the DMZ or on what day of his visit he will be granted an audience with Kim Jong-il. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this relative U.S. silence and inattention is tantamount to Washington’s unconditional support for the as of yet unarticulated goals of this summit.

While it is diplomatically inappropriate for U.S. officials to express anything other than support for inter-Korean initiatives, the U.S. already has enough image problems in Korea without being wrongly perceived as opposed to unification. Privately many U.S. officials express misgivings about the possible impact of the upcoming summit. Just as the focal point of U.S. attention on North Korea remains centered on the nuclear issue, the misgivings that Washington may have about the summit are focused upon the impact the summit may have upon the ongoing effort to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

To be sure, there are some in the Bush Administration, primarily centered in the State Department offices working so furiously to maintain some progress in implementing the Feb. 13 agreement of the Six-Party talks, who are prepared to see the inter-Korean summit as something that might build on and support the momentum of the nuclear talks.

The more prevalent view is that the timing of the North-South summit is more driven by domestic political concerns in advance of South Korea’s presidential election than by any coordinated effort tied to progress in the six-party talks. President Roh’s eagerness for a trip to Pyongyang is perceived by some in Washington more to be taking advantage of a period of U.S. flexibility than a logical outgrowth of the six-party talks. Whatever internal U.S.-South Korea coordination might actually be taking place regarding the summit, the impression of a separate and divergent track was furthered by President Roh’s declaration that he did not intend to raise the nuclear issue in his discussions in Pyongyang.

If that is indeed the case, there is a risk that the summit may serve to solidify North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state. Nearly a full year after North Korea tested a nuclear weapon, it is difficult to find evidence of the tight international consensus that was in part responsible for convincing North Korea to return to the negotiating table. The U.N. Security Council sanctions passed in the wake of the test remain largely unimplemented, South Korea has resumed food and fertilizer aid, and after years of declarations that his administration would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea, President Roh is holding a summit meeting with a North Korean regime that has yet to even begin to negotiate the status of its nuclear weapons and fissile material. This, coupled with the economic aid package that is assumed to be on the table, legitimately raise the questions of what price North Korea has paid for its nuclear test, and what motivation it might have to move beyond the drawn-out negotiations regarding its decrepit Yongbyon facility and start real negotiations on its actual nuclear weapons.

Beyond the nuclear issue, there is also some concern about what appear to be plans for some type of "peace declaration" during the Pyongyang summit. While on the surface it is hard to be opposed to "peace" in any form, a mere declaration without any underlying change in the security situation on the peninsula could serve to complicate U.S.-South Korea alliance relations. In addition to the obvious havoc that North Korea would likely raise about the continued presence of U.S. troops after such a declaration, it is important to consider the political reaction in Washington. A declaration of peace, even one lacking in substance, will inevitably reinvigorate the debate in Washington regarding the future of U.S. troops in Korea. Despite the numerous official declarations of continued commitment to the alliance that will inevitably follow any declaration, the political ramifications will be unavoidable, particularly in a world of very real resource constraints on the U.S. military. To be clear, there are few in Washington who would resist real progress toward peace on the peninsula. However, as President Bush made abundantly clear when pressed by President Roh during their post APEC press conference, real progress toward peace is predicated on progress on the nuclear issue.

The North-South summit ultimately is an inter-Korean matter, yet the nature of alliances, and the ever growing international stature that South Korea commands on the world stage mean that whatever takes place in Pyongyang will ultimately demand the attention even of a distracted United States. The Roh Administration may have agreed to use the North Korean phrasing "woori minjok ggilliamong" or "among Koreans alone" in describing the aspirations for the summit, yet as he travels North, he would be well advised to remember that the ramifications of this summit extend far beyond the Korean peninsula.

Gordon Flake is the executive director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.