Kim Jong-il’s decision to pursue a summit is designed to further his own tactical and strategic objectives. These include a desire to influence South Korea’s presidential elections, to distract from North Korea’s denuclearization commitments, to affirm the status quo through mutual recognition and acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state, and to benefit domestically from having South Korea’s leader pay tribute to Kim Jong-il at home.

Kim Jong-il might use the summit positively by publicly affirming North Korea’s denuclearization commitments, declaring peace with South Korea, or accepting South Korean economic offerings, indirectly pressuring the United States to implement diplomatic normalization with North Korea while leaving questions of implementation to the future.

Kim Jong-il will use the home court to his advantage, but a second look at his objectives, even despite last October’s nuclear test, reveals more weakness than strength. Never has North Korea attempted to assert itself so boldly in favor of one side than in its attempts to marginalize the opposition Grand National Party. What if Korean voters still vote for change, regardless of the summit? Having campaigned for continuity, Kim Jong-il would be a loser.

The timing of the summit, prior to the completion of the implementation of the February 13th agreement and prior to North Korea’s implementation of its commitment to full denuclearization, imposes an unavoidable burden on Roh Moo-hyun to raise the nuclear issue. Kim’s response on a subject that North Korean officials have traditionally avoided discussing with South Korea will draw out North Korea’s top leader regarding his nuclear intentions.

Despite Kim Jong-il’s strategic calculus, a second inter-Korean summit draws him further into the public light and diminishes the opacity surrounding the North Korean regime. Kim’s economic needs reveal his dependency on external aid, which should only be given transparently with the full approval of the Korean taxpayer.

Roh may offer, but South Korea’s next leader should not be obligated to pay for North Korea’s economic development without a return on investment. The sooner that Kim Jong-il is placed in harness to South Korean public opinion, the sooner a more reciprocal inter-Korean relationship will be realized. In this respect, the timing of the summit could not be better.

Roh faces a structural constraint on how far he can go to please North Korea without risking public backlash and damaging progressive chances to maintain power, but a successful summit in the eyes of South Koreans will enhance progressive chances and constrain his successor. If this indeed proves to be the case, my wager is that South Korean public will be the true winner, and that North Korea’s leaders will have no choice but to play out their hand.

Scott Snyder is a Senior Associate with The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS. The views expressed here are personal views. He can be reached at ssnyder@asiafound-dc.org.