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An old saying has it that you can only do well and exercise your power abroad if all is calm and peaceful at home -- a lesson that a person from a noisy and dysfunctional home can¡¯t accomplish much in society. The same applies to a country. If the leadership puts the country into turmoil with corruption and fosters a society whose members feud and clash, it cannot expect to be treated well abroad, nor can they acquit themselves well. It's impossible for such a country to conduct proper diplomacy.
Many people watching President Roh Moo-hyun go to Pyongyang early in October will feel that way. A president with less than three months left in his tenure whose closest aides are being grilled by the authorities about corruption scandals; a politically sterile president devoid of a ruling party to lead, whose de-facto party is torn asunder: seeing such a president make a grand entrance in Pyongyang is rather pitiful.
How will he sit down face-to-face with a self-confident man used to absolute rule? Will he have the nerve to say what he should, and reject what he should, with dignity as the representative of South Korea? Will he be able to act as a bulwark for the South's security and peace, its leader in reality as well as in name? The public is uneasy about that.
Unfortunately, he keeps betraying public expectations. He ridiculed public hopes that the first point on the agenda of the inter-Korean summit should be the complete dismantling of North Korea¡¯s nuclear facilities and weapons because that was like ¡°provoking a quarrel.¡± That is incoherent babble from a person responsible for the security of the country.
The agenda of the summit, he says, is peace. It¡¯s peace everything: peace settlement, peace agreement, peace declaration¡¦ Needless to say, peace is a concept transcending everything in a world filled with disputes. But no peace is achieved by words, agreement or declaration alone. Could peace be achieved with words, agreement and declaration, neither world wars nor any other conflicts would have taken place. But peace can be realized only when it is accompanied by specific measures and substantial devices guaranteeing it. And the devices or means guaranteeing peace on the Korean Peninsula lie in denuclearization; not a declared denuclearization, but denuclearization in reality, the complete abolition of all nuclear weapons, programs and facilities.
If the heads of state of the two Koreas want to discuss peace, they should start with the complete dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities and weapons. A peace accord or declaration comes next. Roh seems determined to reverse the order, or perhaps he¡¯s only interested in one of them. It is unbelievable that the president of South Korea regards the North Korean nuclear problem as mere trouble. How can a matter on which the security of the state and its people depend be a trouble to him? Or at least it should be the most important trouble he is put to. But embedded in Roh's brains is a perception that any controversy is trouble, and that anything the North doesn¡¯t want to discuss is controversial.
He said asking him to discuss the nuclear program is like telling him to quarrel with Kim Jong-il. Fine, but isn¡¯t it natural to quarrel if there is something important to quarrel about? ¡°Quarreling¡± doesn¡¯t necessarily mean acting in a way that runs counter to diplomacy. Assuming it even qualifies as quarreling if you explain what should be explained and cordially impart your people¡¯s wishes as their representative, then you must quarrel. In any case, why does a man who so often quarrels with foreign leaders on the international stage intend to be so modest before Kim Jong-il?
Roh is unlikely to stop there. His staff seems to have decided to make some concessions on the Northern Limit Line, the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas. And although it is conditional on the North's request, Roh is also likely to watch the Arirang mass calisthenics, a propaganda performance for the North Korean regime. One worries he might do something else in Pyongyang we would have thought him incapable of. Given his unpredictability, running first one way and then the other at home, who knows if he might not use the stage offered by the North to pull another stunt. We can only hope that he doesn¡¯t exercise his famous ¡°contrary¡¯ way of thinking again.
The question is whether we will be helplessly bound afterwards by any rash agreements he makes and bills he issues in Pyongyang. The question whether we should unconditionally accept and comply with any accords he may reach in Pyongyang, whatever discussions he holds and whatever action he takes. The presidential election 100 days from now will give the answer.
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