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How might the hostage crisis in Afghanistan be calculated in terms of gains and losses? Though the crisis ended with the saving of 21 lives, the government has come under fire at home and abroad. It's very difficult to calculate the resulting gains or losses from negotiations. But through the prism of game theory, an economic strategy theory, we can make a guess as to what the Korean government has gained and what it has lost.
◆ Korea swerved first
The confrontation between the Korean government and the Taliban was similar to a game of chicken. In that game two drivers race their cars towards each other on a collision course. To avoid a crash one driver must swerve or stop. The one who does so is called a chicken and loses the game. One strategy for winning is to "rush" -- driving straight at the opponent and hoping he will swerve. In the worst-case scenario neither driver swerves and both die in the resulting crash. In the context of the hostage drama, the government's ignoring the Taliban's demands would be a rush strategy and rescuing the hostages in return for a ransom or an exchange of Taliban prisoners would be a swerve. As for the Taliban, killing all the hostages would be a rush strategy and their unconditional release would be a swerve.
According to game theory, there were three strategic options in the hostage crisis. First, the Korean government could have chosen a rush strategy forcing the Taliban to swerve. In this case, the government would have rescued the hostages without paying a high cost. Second, the Taliban could have taken a rush strategy and the Korean government a swerve strategy. Third, both sides could have rushed at each other. In that case, all the hostages would have been killed and the Taliban kidnappers annihilated.
Korea chose the second option. In other words, the Taliban gained everything. The Korean government accepted the Taliban's demands, but rescued the hostages. Korea managed to avoid the worst-case scenario, or the third option. But the result of the second option was nothing like the outcome that might have been produced from the first option, the best-case scenario.
In the game of chicken, the best winning strategy is to convince your opponent before the game starts that you will never swerve, that you intend to rush. You might show your determination by setting your steering wheel or accelerator pedal in a fixed position. In game theory this strategy is called "credible threat."
But in the early stage of the hostage crisis, the Korean government quickly announced that it planned to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and engage in face-to-face negotiations. In other words, Korea revealed too soon its plan to swerve. In contrast, the Taliban's credible threat was effective.
As a result, it was possible to predict from an early stage the result of the hostage drama, experts point out. This is in stark contrast to the German government's strategy of continuing to ignore terrorists' threats to kill German hostages.
"Although it had more bargaining chips, the Korean government made a limited choice at a very early stage," said Park Chan-hee, a professor of business administration at Chung-Ang University. "This was because our society had never experienced a hostage crisis before."
◆Korea earns a weak reputation
There was another problem with the negotiations with the terrorists, which is explained by the "repeated games" theory of economics. Repeated games refer to a series or a repetition of games.
In repeated games, it's very important to build an advantageous reputation if you are to seize a vantage point ahead of your opponent. As a typical case, the Roman legions dampened their enemy's will by cultivating a reputation for extreme vengeance -- making others believe that they would hunt down and annihilate anyone who attacks, under any circumstances. The U.S. follows similar principles, declaring that it will never negotiate with terrorists and that it will always recover the bodies of U.S. soldiers.
According to Hahn Sun-ku, a professor of economics at Yonsei University, the Korean government now has a weak reputation as a chicken, making it vulnerable to terrorists. In a sense, the Korean government has sent a message to all terrorist groups around the world that taking Koreans hostage can be a good source of income, Hahn said.
Experts in game theory emphasize that the best strategy to minimize terrorist threats is to leave a deep impression on terrorist organizations, making them believe they will pay dearly for taking hostages -- that our country is unyielding on hostage issues.
(englishnews@chosun.com )
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