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I was attending a conference of academic and policy experts on Asia when suddenly my blackberry started to buzz with a combination of email, text, and phone messages. As I excused myself from the meeting to retrieve these missives, my suspicion was that something had happened related to the DPRK. When I returned to the meeting to convey the news, the group of well-seasoned Asia experts responded with a mixture of laughter and cynicism. One asked, "Do two lame ducks make one summit?"
There is no denying a meeting of the two Korean leaders is an event that garners world attention and captures the imagination of Koreans everywhere. The image of the two leaders embracing against the backdrop of cheering throngs, and spouting words of peace and unity cause all Koreans to stand tall. But here is the problem: This was enough for the world when the first summit happened. A picture and a few words about peace are definitely not enough the second time around.
I have always believed that the South Korean leader should set the bar high for a summit. In other words, South Korea should not be the supplicant, begging for a meeting in Pyongyang, but should only agree to a meeting when certain conditions are met. One does not get the sense that the bar was very high in this instance. Indeed, as many internet sites have already observed, this looks like a last-minute political ploy designed to influence an election in December and for which a considerable sum of cash will probably be transferred to North Korea.
This does not mean the ROK government cannot turn this meeting into a positive event. Indeed, there are several things that would help. First, there should be a clear statement in advance of the visit, what if anything, the ROK government will be paying for this meeting. Especially given the revelations after the June 2000 summit about money transfers, the South Korean taxpayers deserve to hear clearly the answer to this concern.
Second, while there are likely to be agreements reached on family reunions and on inter-Korean economic cooperation, there should be some addressing of the past abductions of South Korean citizens by the North. This is a difficult and largely ignored issue, but a step here would begin the long process of reconciling the DPRK regime's human rights record as it seeks more normalized relations with the rest of the world.
Third, a statement of peace by the two leaders will not be greeted with much credibility by the world. We have seen many statements in the past coming out of Pyongyang and conveyed by past ROK emissaries that have come to naught. Words have to support actions and the only actions that have been serious on the peninsula lately have been those of the Six party talks. Real people are doing real work -- shutting down reactors, installing cameras and delivering energy -- all for the purpose of creating peace on the peninsula. In this regard, what would be more useful than a peace declaration would be a reaffirmation by the DPRK of its commitments in the 1992 North-South Joint Denuclearization Declaration, and tangible steps to prove it.
An inter-Korean meeting of this nature should support rather than detract from progress thus far made in the implementation of the February 13 agreement. Rather than returning with general words that the North is committed to the agreement, it would be more helpful if there were clear commitments to complete the next phase of the agreement -- declaration and disablement -- by the end of this year, and the entire agreement within two years. This would be the most concrete way of ensuring the summit's success and enhancing peace prospects on the peninsula.
The author was a White House Asia advisor from 2004 to 2007 and was U.S. Deputy Head of Delegation to the Six Party talks.
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