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What happened to Pyeongchang¡¯s failed bid for the 2014 Winter Olympics? Hosting the games would have been a major achievement for the ROK. Not only would it have marked the second time that Korea hosted the world for the Olympics, but also the first time the Winter Games would have been held in Asia outside of Japan (the previous two occasions were Nagano in 1998 and Sapporo in 1972), and collectively only the sixth time since 1896 that the Games would have been held in Asia.
The International Olympic Committee¡¯s (IOC) choice of the Russian Black Sea resort Sochi was even more perplexing given that the body 4 years ago nearly awarded Pyeongchang the 2010 Winter Games giving them the most votes on the first ballot before awarding it ultimately to Vancouver. And as Korea¡¯s highly capable point person for the 2014 Pyeongchang bid, Han Seung-soo noted, Seoul felt as though it had addressed as best it could many of the concerns raised by the IOC after the 2010 decision.
So what happened? Well, the competition among the final bid cities was certainly strong. Salzburg, Austria offered tradition and experience, having hosted two Winter Games already, and having many world class venues already built. But Salzburg¡¯s bid in 2010 and came in third behind Pyeongchang and Vancouver. Sochi, Russia offered the prospect of the first Winter Olympics in Russia amid the beauty of the Black Sea and the soaring Caucasus Mountains. Russia, newly flush with cash from oil and gas reserves pledged $12 billion to ensure the success if the Games.
But none of the Russian Olympic sites have yet been developed, and there is literally no infrastructure yet ready. Moreover, an IOC June 4 technical report rated Pyeongchang higher than Sochi. One explanation is that Korea suffered a similar fate as Japan did in 1988 when Seoul beat out Nagoya to host the Summer Games. As many will remember, Seoul¡¯s 52-27 victory over Nagoya was widely considered an upset. At that time, some argued that Nagoya¡¯s loss stemmed from the fact that Japan was already rich with world-class sporting events, including having already hosted the Tokyo Games in 64 and the Sapporo Games in 1972.
By the same token, one could argue that Pyeongchang¡¯s loss came on the heels of the ROK¡¯s winning the 2011 World Athletic Championships in Taegu and Asian Games in Incheon in 2014. Another explanation, offered by an ROK diplomat to me, was that ¡°Pyeongchang¡± sounded too close to ¡°Pyongyang.¡± This joke, however, may not be too far from the truth.
Somewhere in the ROK government, a decision was made to politicize the Pyeongchang bid in terms of inter-Korean relations. President Roh came to Guatemala for the IOC vote as his Russian and Austrian counterparts had done. In the days before the IOC vote, the ROK augmented their technical presentation with many high-level political statements about how awarding the Olympics to Korea will help foster reunification. Roh stated that the IOC could foster Korean peace and enable the fielding of a united Korean team, should Pyeongchang win the bid. The governor of Pyeongchang¡¯s Kangwon province also noted that the Olympics could help foster unification of the only divided province on the peninsula.
Of course, the Olympics is about politics. But Seoul may have played the unification card, one time too many. The IOC¡¯s awarding the games to Korea would not substantially enhance unification prospects. Moreover, leveraging this argument in a way that somehow puts pressure on the IOC to bear responsibility for Korean unification by its choice of venue was an ill-advised strategy. Korea should not try to use unification as a crutch to get help from others.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the two Koreas can field a unified team. Already in the negotiations for a unified team for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, there are clear problems. Marching into the stadium as a unified group is not difficult and in fact has become a commonplace occurrence for the two Koreas. But DPRK demands that a unified team must meet a quota of 50 percent DPRK athletes is unreasonable. Korean athletes that make up a unified team should do so based on merit and world-class competitiveness, not based on a politically-motivated quota.
There is no reason that a better, stronger South Korean athlete should give up her place on the team to an inferior DPRK athlete. The ROK bid for 2014 Pyeongchang was well done in the end. But next time, don¡¯t play the unification card again. It doesn¡¯t work anymore.
Victor Cha served as a White House advisor on Asia from 2004 to 2007. He is now a professor at Georgetown writing a book on Sports Diplomacy and the Beijing Olympics.
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