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Many Asian and American commentators have spoken critically of the Bush administration¡¯s recent policies toward to North Korea. The Washington Post¡¯s editorial page on June 24 described in disapproving terms, a ¡°string of concessions¡± made by the United States while Pyongyang sits idle, not fulfilling its commitment to shut down the Yongbyon reactor facilities within 60 days of February 13. Conservatives in Washington are unhappy that the United States agreed not only to support the unfreezing of all DPRK frozen assets held at Banco Delta Asia, but also took the extraordinary step of facilitating the transfer of funds through the U.S. Federal Reserve to a North Korean Foreign Trade Bank account in Russia. Conservatives in Seoul are equally dissatisfied with the Administration¡¯s willingness to allow high-level U.S. officials to go to Pyongyang too early in the negotiation process, and are quietly concerned that the United States is moving too quickly down a path of normalization and even a peace treaty with the DPRK. All attribute this new found American flexibility to an administration that is weak, distracted by events in Iraq, and desperate for a foreign policy victory before the end of the administration. I think this view is wrong.
I can understand why conservatives may be unhappy. I am a conservative despite the view expressed in some newspapers that I have gone from ¡°hawk to dove¡± after my duties as deputy head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party talks. But conservatives should not be overly concerned about what appears to be a momentary period of unreciprocated flexibility by the United States. Behind this generous attitude are firm principles and clear, consistent strategy for denuclearizing North Korea.
First, the United States has demonstrated extraordinary political will. Some may argue that U.S. backtracking on the BDA issue essentially meeting every DPRK demand on the transfer of funds followed by the trips by U.S. officials to Pyongyang show American weakness that the DPRK will only exploit further. But what Asia has always asked of the United States historically in any negotiation regarding the DPRK is to show true political will to deal with the country. In this regard, each day that the U.S. officials worked to resolve the BDA issue to the DPRK¡¯s satisfaction is another day in which Washington with its Six Party partners demonstrated political commitment to the February 13 agreement and the September 2005 Joint Statement. It is now incumbent upon the DPRK to show to all their political will to implement the agreement.
Second, the United States is demonstrating another quality Asia has always asked of its negotiators patience. Despite criticism at home, the administration¡¯s lead negotiator, Chris Hill, has worked hard to get us to the threshold of implementing the initial 60-day phase of the February 13 agreement. U.S. patience stems from a longer-term view outlined in the agreement to move beyond a IAEA-monitored temporary shutdown of Yongbyon to a permanent disablement of the facility by the end of the year. While some may belittle this outcome, it is worth noting that DPRK plutonium, once it is produced, has a half-life of 117,000 years. It is in no one¡¯s interest for the DPRK to make any more of this fissile material. Disablement of the facility would take us farther than any previous administration has gotten in shutting down plutonium production permanently. Should this happen, few will remember the initial delay in implementing the 60-day first phase of the agreement.
Third, the Administration remains consistent in its objective to test DPRK denuclearization intentions. Contrary to the critics¡¯ accusation, the Bush administration has not become wide-eyed optimists on North Korea. Instead, it pursues a systematic diplomatic strategy design to test whether the DPRK is serious about denuclearization. If Pyongyang proves to be serious, then the administration with its Six Party partners stand ready to press the negotiation harder, moving to the final phase of nuclear dismantlement in 2008. However, if Pyongyang does not implement the February 13 agreement, then it will be clear to all Six Party participants and all U.N. member states where the blame sits for the breakdown of the agreement.
How far is the administration willing to go in order to ¡°test¡± the DPRK? As is often the case in the policy world, this cannot be determined by artificial constructs, but is a judgment call made by the President and his national security team as events evolve. It is my view that the administration may continue to engage in normalization talks with the DPRK or even consider Four-party discussions on a peace treaty ending the Korean war, but that it will never conclude either of these discussions until we are in the final phase of nuclear dismantlement. This is because no U.S. administration, Republican or Democrat, will normalize relations or conclude a peace treaty with a North Korean nuclear weapons state. Conservatives should have no gripe with that.
This column was contributed by Victor Cha, the former White House top adviser on North Korea, who is currently a Georgetown University international relations professor.
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