Is there any chance that the North Korean regime will give up its nuclear weapons? The question is perhaps more frequently heard than any other in recent days. But regrettably, the answer is almost certainly no. Pyongyang stands to lose much and gain almost nothing if it does.

Since the 1970s when it started nuclear development, Pyongyang has been pursuing two goals at the same time. For the North Korean leadership, nuclear weapons are not only a means to extract concessions and aid from the international community but also a deterrent against a foreign invasion. Depending on the changing domestic and international situation, Pyongyang has sometimes regarded its nuclear program as a deterrent and at other times as a means to get concessions.

At the time of the Geneva Accords in 1994, some people called them proof showing that North Korea is prepared to give up its nuclear program. But over the 13 years since then, the situation inside and outside North Korea has changed profoundly. Back in 1994, Pyongyang faced a serious crisis. In the wake of the collapse of communism, North Korea was unable to get aid from China and the Soviet Union. It was internationally isolated, and its economy was on the verge of ruin. And that year, Washington's foreign policy was not in favor of using force to resolve international crises. In those circumstances, using the nuclear program as a means to get foreign aid was an eminently rational choice.

But North Korea in 2007 is very different. For one thing, it now gets aid from both China and South Korea. The two have never welcomed North Korea's nuclear development, but they regard the collapse of the North Korean regime and the instability that might bring as a bigger threat than nuclear weapons. This was once again confirmed when the two continued to give aid to North Korea, despite U.S. pressure, following North Korea's nuclear test. North Korea doesn't need U.S. aid as much as it did in the past as long as its survival is guaranteed, albeit in the short term, by aid from China and South Korea. In other words, the North’s nuclear weapons have lost much of their value as a means to extract foreign aid.

Yet the list of things North Korea might lose if it gives nuclear weapons up has become longer. First, the strategic value of nuclear weapons as a deterrent has grown as Pyongyang became fearful of an attack from the U.S. following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, Pyongyang has realized that it will be difficult to put pressure on the international community in the future without nuclear weapons. Objectively speaking, without its nuclear weapons North Korea would be just another dirt-poor Third-World tyranny.

Third, North Korea is using the nuclear arms as a means to maintain its political system domestically. In an official editorial on New Year's Day, North Korea said, "Our possession of a nuclear deterrent fulfills our people's long-cherished desire for an invincible country." The regime could damage its own domestic power base if it gave up nuclear weapons, which it has portrayed at home as a symbol of the great victory of the military-first doctrine.

So is compromise impossible? No. There is a high likelihood that North Korea will agree to freeze its nuclear research if it gets sufficient aid. North Korea displayed its nuclear capability by conducting a nuclear test last October. Increasing the nuclear stockpile to 100 from the current estimated 10 would not boost their political efficacy 10-fold. A few nuclear weapons stashed away in a secret location are enough as a deterrent or a political means. North Korea can afford to shut down the research facilities because it no longer needs to produce any more nuclear weapons. Of course, that will have to come in return for generous aid. But Pyongyang will keep what nuclear weapons it has already produced, because that, to the North Korean regime, is the most rational policy.

The column was contributed by Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul.