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The Feb. 13 agreement to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis has already started creaking. Within 60 days of the accord, the U.S. was to release North Korean funds frozen at Macao's bank Banco Delta Asia, and North Korea to shut down and seal its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and have it verified by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. During the same period, South Korea was to supply to the North 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and the parties to six-nation talks were to put in motion working groups discussing a wide range of issues.
The deadline came and went. North Korea did not shut down and seal its reactor at Yongbyon. All other schedules were cancelled and the U.S. State Department issued a shameful statement saying the early deadline was postponed.
What went wrong? Needless to say, North Korea is the guiltiest party. The U.S. did everything it could to resolve the BDA question, a precondition North Korea raised. The U.S. Treasury Department released all the US$25 million frozen at the bank, both legal and illegal funds. Going a step further, the department took all the necessary technical steps so that Pyongyang could withdraw them any time it wants to. But the North insisted that the situation be restored to what it was before the BDA affair flared up. It demands not only the release of the $25 million but the normalization of all its overseas financial transactions. This is impossible unless the alleged illegal actions that provoked the financial sanctions stop. If the North sticks to the demand, the Feb.13 accord won't move forward by one inch.
But the U.S. is also responsible for letting the deadline slip. The Bush administration, in the wake of its defeat in the 2006 mid-term elections, was impatient for quick results and changed its North Korea policy. The Feb. 13 accord makes no reference to the existing nuclear weapons, the essence of the crisis. Washington hastily pushed ahead with a working-level conference on normalizing diplomatic ties with Pyongyang before the nature of the Feb. 13 accord was fully disclosed. In an attempt to hasten the resolution of the BDA issue, the U.S. overstrained itself to reconcile the position of the Treasury Department and the legal issues involved. As a result of offering the North excessive expectations and confidence the U.S. lost a lever in negotiation and in effect wasted the 60 days.
South Korea, too, is responsible. Even before the Feb. 13 accord was out, our government proposed dialogue and resumed assistance to the North. The justification was to induce North Korea to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons, a wholly unrealistic claim. In the 20th inter-Korean ministerial talks, the government chose to link rice aid to the initial implementation of the Feb. 13 accord. But although the North stalled, citing the unresolved BDA question, the government resumed fertilizer aid and promised rice. The administration has recklessly deprived itself of a card to pressure the North into implementing the Feb. 13 agreement.
Some quarters say that North Korea, once the BDA question is resolved, is highly likely to implement the early-stage promises under the agreement -- shutting down and sealing its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and inviting IAEA inspectors.
But if the countries involved run about like headless chickens in the initial stage, the process of actually dismantling the North¡¯s nuclear weapons will take even longer. Seoul and Washington both face presidential elections. They should learn their lesson from the failure to meet the initial deadline and tackle the North Korean nuclear crisis from a position that transcends domestic politics. Our government must attempt to resolve the nuclear crisis by adjusting the speed with which it tries to improve inter-Korean relations accordingly.
The column was contributed by Yoo Ho-yeol, a North Korea scholar at Korea University.
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