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The New York Times reported that the Bush administration allowed North Korea to secretly export arms to Ethiopia, three months after Washington succeeded in getting the UN to impose strict sanctions on the communist country following its nuclear test. The deal appears to have taken place, judging from the response of the U.S. government.
Last October, the U.S. initiated and led the formulation and implementation of UN Resolution 1718. Article 8 of that resolution prohibits all UN member nations from purchasing arms or weapons components from North Korea. Member nations were not merely advised to abide by that rule, but were obligated to do so without exception. At that time, the U.S. had called it the strongest resolution drawn up against North Korea, citing Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that clearly states forceful measures. When that resolution was passed, Ethiopia informed the U.S. of the purchase contract for arms from North Korea, including former Soviet T-55 tank parts. The U.S. decided to let this pass. The North Korean arms shipment entered Ethiopia in January without any problems. This was a clear violation of the UN resolution. The U.S. government reportedly tolerated the arms deal because Ethiopia was fighting armed Muslim forces in nearby Somalia. It¡¯s like the logic that the enemy of your enemy is your friend.
After the passage of the UN resolution, the U.S. had called for a halt in cash going into North Korea through the Kaesong Industrial Complex and tours to the North¡¯s scenic Mt.Kumgang resort. The U.S. said North Korea could use that money to produce weapons of mass destruction. But at the same time, Washington was allowing Ethiopia to pay North Korea for the arms deal. In September 2005, the U.S. designated Macau¡¯s Banco Delta Asia as a financial institution suspected of laundering North Korea¡¯s ill-gotten gains, and now it is racking its brains trying to find a way to return the frozen funds to North Korea.
A perennial characteristic of international affairs is that what¡¯s prohibited today may be allowed tomorrow, depending on national interests. America¡¯s position now is that North Korea must first scrap its nuclear program before Washington will form formal diplomatic ties. Nobody opposes this approach. But in some sections of the U.S., there is talk that it could be better for America to form diplomatic ties with North Korea even if it does not abandon its nuclear weapons. There is no guarantee that this view may never become the mainstream approach of the U.S. government. It would be entirely within character. The future security of South Korea can only be protected by the determination of South Koreans, nobody else. We are getting close to the moment when we will realize this fact.
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