Following the Feb. 13 six-party agreement, North Korea and the U.S. held working-group talks on normalizing relations in New York on Monday and Tuesday. Since it was a "working" group, the two sides must have focused on practical matters related to the implementation of the six-party agreement, rather than any strategic discussions to find a breakthrough in normalizing relations. But many are already making rosy predictions about bilateral relations, while many others speculate that the two sides might be attempting some "big deal." But it remains to be seen if North Korea-U.S. relations will thaw with an almighty rush or any rapid progress in the North Korean nuclear problem is imminent.

With the six-party agreement as momentum, it is clear that the two sides have decided to engage in dialogue rather than continue confrontation over the nuclear problem. This is a welcome change of directions. But it is clear that the nuclear issue can't be resolved through dialogue alone. Those who have called for bilateral negotiations to resolve the nuclear crisis may believe that they were right since the situation has now gained some fresh momentum. But bilateral negotiations are not a panacea. The nuclear issue remains complicated. Negotiations have just begun.

It is also wrong to believe that the U.S. is suddenly prepared for a compromise or becoming dovish on the nuclear issue. American critics have chastised the Bush administration not for its tough stance against North Korea but for having given North Korea time to develop nuclear weapons without pushing for negotiations hard enough or putting enough pressure on it. It would be a big misunderstanding to see the U.S. negotiations with the North as a sign that the former has made a concession to the latter. Former defense secretary William Perry has called for negotiations with North Korea while strongly criticizing Bush’s North Korea policy. But he has also proposed a bombardment of North Korean missile facilities. That shows that the equation "negotiations = dovish stance" is false.

Likewise, there is no sign that North Korea has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons just because it has come to the dialogue table. The obligations North Korea is supposed to fulfill under the six-party agreement -- closure, shutdown and disablement of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon -- are not new. North Korea already agreed to give up the Yongbyon nuclear facilities 13 years ago, in 1994. The crux in the solution of the nuclear problem lies in whether North Korea is willing to dismantle the nuclear weapons and nuclear materials it already possesses, which were not sufficiently covered in the six-party agreement. During the 1993-1994 nuclear crisis, North Korea never gave up the small amount of nuclear materials it had obtained from its past nuclear activities. To remind ourselves of that helps us understand just how difficult it will be for the North to give up the nuclear weapons it now has.

North Korea-U.S. dialogue has begun, but prospects for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remain gloomy. As long as the six-party agreement links normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations with the solution of the nuclear issue, they will inevitably hit a snag unless North Korea is really willing to give up its nuclear ambitions. And a regime that regards nuclear weapons as a means to maintain its survival will hardly make such a decision overnight. The aim must be to persuade North Korea ultimately to make that decision, while solving problems step by step and one by one through give and take. It would be irrational for North Korea and the U.S. to proceed too fast in improving ties, and it would be undesirable for them to hesitate too much. A patient, prudent, and slow-but-steady attitude will be needed, not any rash cutting of the Gordian knot by seeking a peace agreement, reaching a package settlement, and striking a "grand deal." In that sense, it is unhelpful if we get our hopes up too high after only the first round of the North-U.S. working-group talks.

The column was contributed by Paik Jin-hyun, associate dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University.