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The defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States have agreed to dismantle the Combined Forces Command (CFC) on April 17, 2012. On that day, wartime operational control will be handed over to South Korea. The world¡¯s fastest, most-efficient and powerful system of war deterrent will disappear, while the fate of the Korean Peninsula will be put to the test for no reason. Last year, when the leaders of the two countries agreed in principle to dismantle the CFC, former defense minister Chun Yong-taek said, ¡°The president has finally made a big mistake.¡± What else is one to call it now?
Former defense ministers, officers, generals, foreign ministers, heads of police and other officials implored the government to stop the move, pointing out the bad timing of the dismantling of the CFC, saying, ¡°not now when North Korea has conducted a nuclear test.¡± But this administration simply ignored such calls. The first defense minister, foreign minister, ambassador to the United States and national security advisor of this administration all voiced their beliefs that the CFC should not be dismantled, but to no use. The defense committee of the National Assembly passed a resolution opposing the move, but the presidential office pushed through with the move anyway. Two out of three Koreans (66 percent of all respondents in a Gallup survey last September) opposed the move, but this administration paid no attention. President Roh Moo-hyun even criticized former high-ranking military officers for being ¡°pompous.¡± He scorned the Korean public for ¡°hiding behind America¡¯s rear end¡± and for ¡°trembling in fear like the leaves on a tree.¡±
Korea¡¯s national security faces two challenges. One is a North Korea crisis that can erupt at any moment. Even Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo said, ¡°North Korea¡¯s nuclear test poses the greatest security threat since the Korean War.¡± What is the reason for dismantling the CFC at such a dangerous time?
The reason the CFC has prevented war was the prospect of the sheer volume of U.S. reinforcement troops that would be dispatched to the Korean Peninsula in case of an emergency. Former South Korean Defense Minister Chun estimated that deterrent effect to be worth 1,300 trillion won. The Korean public is concerned that if the CFC is dismantled, then this reinforcement would become uncertain. This administration said a guarantee on continued reinforcements would be achieved during the South Korea-U.S. defense ministerial talks. But in the joint statement following the meeting, there was not a single mention of reinforcements. Various types of joint military plans will also disappear. In the event of a North Korean emergency, all of our channels to utilize the assistance of U.S. troops could be blocked.
The other challenge facing South Korea¡¯s national security is the change in America¡¯s global strategy. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has been shifting its global military posture to a lighter and more mobile force, capable of responding to any type of war. U.S. forces in South Korea have already begun downsizing and are changing to a structure where it can ship out of the Korean Peninsula at any time. The reason the United States is aggressively pursuing the transition of wartime military control is due to this change in strategy. Once the South Korean military assumes complete wartime military control, U.S. troop size may drop even further. At a time when the last thing we need is a drop in U.S. troop strength, this administration has been waving an outdated flag called ¡°self sufficiency,¡± shouting out slogans calling for the dismantling of the CFC.
After the South Korea-U.S. defense ministerial meeting, the presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae issued a statement welcoming the agreement. The South Korean government is just patting itself on the back. But due to the success of this administration¡¯s protest, the public will have to shoulder hundreds of trillions of won in security costs, while having to live under a greater threat of North Korean aggression.
The milk has been spilt. The symbolic value of the CFC has been destroyed, while the chances of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il making a serious mistake have shifted from an impossibility to a possibility. The basic framework of South Korea¡¯s national security has been shaken. Whoever it may be, the leader of the next administration must again make military strategy a matter of national security, rather than a political issue, and start from the beginning to stabilize the situation.
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