Article 6 of the Feb. 13 agreement on steps for North Korea to end its nuclear development reaffirms Article 4 of the Sept. 19, 2005 statement of principles. The latter stipulates, "The parties directly concerned will have negotiations at an appropriate separate forum on a durable peace system on the Korean Peninsula."

Building a peace framework on the Korean Peninsula means ending an unstable armistice and a military confrontational structure caused by the Korean War and establishing durable peace. That requires steps including the denuclearization of the peninsula, arms control between the two Koreas, normalization of diplomatic ties between the North and the United States and the North and Japan, and conclusion and guarantee of a peace agreement. Determining which to give priority to -- denuclearization or a peace framework -- is vital. Of course, it is possible to start talks on a peace framework by forming a separate forum even before North Korea dismantles its nuclear facilities. But a peace agreement should be concluded when North Korea dismantles its nuclear facilities and that has been verified to a considerable extent.

In such talks, North Korea may well use disruptive tactics. Even if a peace forum is launched separately from the six-party talks, North Korea will highly likely call on the United States to conclude the peace agreement via bilateral talks. If North Korea proposes trilateral talks between the two Koreas and the U.S. and the proposal is accepted, it still cannot be ruled out that North Korea will turn them into virtual bilateral talks and drive a wedge between South Korea and the U.S. If it judges that U.S. position or suggestions fall short of its expectations, Pyiongyang will likely disturb the entire structure -- inter-Korean relations, Seoul-Washington relations, and its own relations with the U.S. -- by suddenly accepting the request for an inter-Korean summit and issuing some kind of peace declaration between the two Koreas.

If the two Koreas were to conclude one as a prelude to a peace agreement, some people in South Korea may stress that there is no longer any justification for the U.S. forces' presence here. If the two Koreas conduct speedy talks on a peace framework before South Korea and the U.S. present any concrete visions for it, it could cause a crack in the Seoul-Washington alliance. Only when the U.S. is confident that it can keep its forces on the Korean Peninsula after the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons has been removed can it cooperate in building a peace framework. South Korea and the U.S. can produce synergistic effects between building a peace system and their alliance only when the two agree to build a comprehensive alliance that includes the U.S. military structure in South Korea after full operational control of Korean forces has been handed over to Seoul, and when the role of South Korean and U.S. forces on both the regional and global scale has been established.

It may be possible to consult with the U.S. in such a way as to link the building of a peace system with North Korea's dismantlement of its nuclear facilities. It may be possible to link concrete decisions in building it -- who should be the parties concerned to a peace agreement; talks on a peace system; conclusion of a peace agreement; and the building of a peace system -- with North Korea's dismantlement of its nuclear program -- the shutdown of North Korean nuclear facilities, reporting, verification and dismantlement. South Korea and the United States need to agree explicitly, in advance to push for the a peace agreement that does not affect the continuity and strength of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

U.S. president John F. Kennedy said, "Peace does not rest in the charters and covenants alone but it lies in the hearts and minds of all people." I look forward to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a peace framework that will take root in people's minds.

The column was contributed by Kim Sung-han, a professor with the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security.