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U.S. President George W. Bush on Tuesday called the pact reached at the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear development program "the first step toward implementing¡± a statement of principles agreed in September 2005. Economic, humanitarian and energy assistance will be provided "as the North carries out its commitments to disable its nuclear facilities," he said. White House spokesman Tony Snow said, "If they don't abide by the terms, they don't get the benefits they desire," adding, "There is still a possibility of sanctions through the international community." The statements make it clear that the agreement is premised on the North's will to implement it.
From the perspective of the U.S., the accord aims not only to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis but to attempt a general shift in U.S. relations with North Korea, the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Working groups are soon to discuss denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, normalizing Washington-Pyongyang ties and establishing peace and security frameworks in Northeast Asia. Washington insists all these matters depend on how North Korea acts from the initial stage -- the shutdown of nuclear facilities and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The worst-case scenario for the U.S. is to repeat the nightmarish failure of the 1994 Geneva Accords. There is also a pragmatic reason for the Bush administration, mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, to achieve results in its negotiations with North Korea. In America, suspicions over the North¡¯s will to implement the agreement are widespread. "This is a freeze with a promise to negotiate subsequent disarmament," said Gary Samore, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, who took part in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea under the Clinton administration. "And a North Korean promise to negotiate later is pretty worthless." Joel Wit, a former State Department official who coordinated the Agreed Framework in 1994, commented, "It gives the illusion of moving more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn't really require anything to happen in the second phase." Underlying those remarks is a fundamental distrust of North Korea.
The Bush administration is therefore likely to act promptly lest Pyongyang has a change of heart. Washington will want to rid Pyongyang of a justification to retreat by easing financial sanctions and unfreezing part of North Korea¡¯s accounts in Macau¡¯s Banco Delta Asia. The U.S. is also expected to act swiftly in removing North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and in terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the foundation of sanctions against the North. There is a chance that the frozen assets of 12 North Korean businesses in the U.S., a largely symbolic measure, will be freed.
By boldly implementing its commitments, the U.S. would increase pressure on the North to take corresponding steps and ask other countries surrounding Korea like China to participate in efforts to keep North Korea from retreating. That Bush said in his statement, "I commend Secretary of State Rice and Ambassador Hill ... for their hard work" suggests that the pragmatic camp led by Rice will keep playing the leading role. Congress, where the Democrats who called for bilateral talks with Pyongyang now hold sway, is expected to accept the pact as significant if not enough. Former U.S. ambassador to Korea Thomas Hubbard said heavy oil aid to North Korea in return for the North's initial actions will face no serious problems in Congress, and that Congress approval may not even be needed if funds are used out of the humanitarian aid budget.
(englishnews@chosun.com )
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