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A full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is now a foregone conclusion. The Sept. 14 Seoul-Washington summit will proclaim the principle of handing over wartime operational control of our forces to Seoul and dismantling Combined Forces Command, and the bilateral Security Consultative Meeting in October will then agree on the conditions and timetable. With that, the U.S. presence in Korea will start winding down. The two countries say a document will pledge the continued presence of some U.S. troops in Korea and the dispatch of U.S. reinforcements in time of war, but we have to wait and see. As a military power, the U.S. will not tolerate a situation that places its forces under a foreign country's military operational control in a foreign land.
It is probably correct to assume that if a nuclear war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. will not throw its ground troops here, though there could be Air Force support. Although the presidential hopefuls say they will "renegotiate" the matter if elected, the outcome of next year's presidential election will carry little meaning since U.S. President George W. Bush, far from being open to renegotiation, seems bent on concluding the matter before the Roh Moo-hyun administration leaves office.
Koreans have allowed themselves to be dragged around by the political ambition and dogmatic imagination of those in power. Former president Kim Dae-jung, in producing the 2000 inter-Korean joint declaration, tried to give the impression that North Korea has neither intention nor capability to invade the South, and that it has somehow agreed to the continued presence of U.S. forces in the South even after unification. The people became thus convinced that the North's military capabilities are inferior to ours and that the protective umbrella of U.S. forces will safeguard us in perpetuity, and as a result they let down their guard. Kim Dae-jung either misread the signs or deceived the people. What's more, Korean society, whose ruling generation has no memory of the Korean War, is becoming indifferent to security while being easily convinced that ¡°national independence¡± is everything and that opportunistic politicians are bent on "cashing in¡± on security issues.
It is time to wake up. We must face the reality that the Republic of Korea could collapse if it fails to defend itself. Further squabbles over the continued stay of U.S. forces or sole exercise of operational control are pointless. They would only hang out our dirty linen for the U.S. to see. Now that the shield that has protected us is disappearing, all our energies must be concentrated on how we will safeguard our security and maintain our economy.
The most urgent task is to prevent the "sea of fire" and the "flames of war" North Korea has threatened us with. What the North was afraid of most was that a military provocations would kill U.S. troops and invite American retaliation. Come to that, it was what the U.S. was most concerned about as well. With the USFK gone, the door will be open for the North to risk a more dangerous gamble. The chances that it will cause explosive chaos in the South with a local provocation or military demonstrations have increased, so we cannot let the North underestimate our defense capabilities. We must modernize our weaponry and boost our civil defense to the level of Israel. We must develop long-range missiles and establish strategies to confront the North's weapons of mass destruction.
To do so, we have to pay more taxes. We must accept that independent defense is neither easy nor cheap. The ruling and opposition parties and their presidential aspirants must present specific blueprints on those matters in the next presidential election. If we are incapable of or unwilling to do so, we must perforce appease the North. To prevent a play with fire in our country, we must turn the other cheek, give if asked, and not provoke the North lest it should get angry. Perhaps that is the path leftwing administrations like Roh Moo-hyun¡¯s already plan to take.
The next government must conduct a multifarious foreign policy for the sake of multilateral and regional security. We must reconsider our policy toward Japan, which is now slanted toward national pride. We have to acknowledge that our quest for "independence" cannot be a hindrance when Japan, joining hands with the U.S., pursues Asian hegemony. Across the sea to our west, there is China, North Korea¡¯s ally, emerging as a world power. Our diplomacy toward China could be a ledger of our security.
Third, we must try to effectively cope with the economic factors at home and abroad that could damage a country from which the U.S. forces are gone. That will require consistent promotion of economic diplomacy and policy to prevent the outflow of foreign capital and the decline of domestic production. Only then can we deal with the natural consequences for a people and a nation who have chosen the wrong politics.
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