|
U.S. President George W. Bush, at a meeting with senior military leaders on Aug. 14, reportedly agreed South Korea is capable of exercising wartime operational control of its forces alone. A military source quoted Bush as telling the meeting to do what the South Korean government wants, adding even if Seoul exercises wartime control of its forces, the U.S. Forces Korea will remain with a four-star general at the helm.
The operational control issue appears to be running toward a pre-determined conclusion. It is expected that a declaration on the matter will be issued at the September summit between the two presidents, and the roadmap will follow at the bilateral Security Consultative Meeting in October.
What will the balance sheets of the two countries look like? Once South Korea exercises operational control of its forces, Combined Forces Command will be dissolved, and with it OPLAN 5027, which entails the dispatch of 600,000 reinforcements and equipment in time of war, worth W130 trillion (US$1=W962). The Korean government can, if it insists, of course secure a document from Washington promising reinforcements. But abandoning OPLAN 5027, which guarantees automatic U.S. reinforcements, and replacing it with a piece of paper that will require congressional approval, however, is like swapping cash for a dubious promissory note. What's more, we will have to pour W620 trillion into our self-defense by 2020 to exercise sole operational control of our forces.
The U.S., meanwhile, can dismantle the CFC, which drags its forces here unconditionally in time of war, and will instead be able to intervene selectively depending on Seoul's request for support. Washington can scale down the USFK to an appropriate level and thereby not only save costs but make a profit by selling Korea the large quantities of arms it will need for its independent defense. In short, Korea will bear the greater risk and cost, while the U.S. will effectively manage us on the periphery of its alliances and save money. This administration will go down in economic history for the most reckless and foolish international transaction ever recorded.
The principle of ¡°strategic flexibility¡± calls for the reduction of U.S. forces stationed overseas and their deployment where they are needed. Transferring operational control of Korean forces to Seoul and dismantling the CFC squarely fits into that international strategy. Until early this year, the U.S. was shy about returning operational control of Korean troops because of the security situation on the peninsula given North Korea's nuclear development and missile launches.
But the U.S. came round to an early transfer when it saw this government politicize the issue into a matter of sovereignty and independence and make it look as if the U.S. had deprived us of it. When Korea is demanding sole forces control, even at the expense of its security, the U.S. has no reason to hesitate. Since it is good for the strategic flexibility of the USFK, take back operational command as early as possible, Washington is thinking. All the government can do now is to find ways of reducing the risk and financial burden to the country a little.
It's no exaggeration to say that the CFC is the backbone of the Korea-U.S. alliance, on which our security, foreign policy and economy have depended for five decades. The president should prepare for the meeting with his U.S. counterpart in just over a fortnight by pooling national expertise in a series of meetings not only with senior defense experts but also successive foreign ministers and business leaders as well. That may -- just may -- reduce the impact of the crime this government is committing against 47 million people and their heirs.
|
