Updated Aug.11,2006 20:55 KST

Call a Referendum on Wartime Control by Kim Dae-joong

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Military Experts Rally Against Forces Control Plans
Ex-Defense Chief Speaks Out Against Wartime Control
National Assembly Told of End to Combined Forces Command
The Government Knows Nothing of Give-and-Take
Presidential Hopefuls ¡®Would Reconsider Wartime Control¡¯
The Presidency Is not for the Timid
Now we know that President Roh Moo-hyun is determined to "withdraw" wartime operational command of our troops from the U.S., it is becoming clear that we can no longer trust the president and his aides to handle the matter alone. It is not simply a question of who exercises wartime operational command of our armed forces. The issue involves the U.S.¡¯ role in defending the Republic of Korea and is directly linked to the security of South Korea.

National defense and security in the modern sense are cooperative work. In a situation where the outcome of a war is no longer simply determined by relative physical force, and where a war, due to the huge advances in weapons development, requires astronomical outlays, it makes simple economic sense to promote national defense in cooperation with a friendly country if at all possible. It is unavoidable that allies plug the gaps in each other¡¯s strength, for example by dividing the roles of air force and navy or by an appropriate distribution of strategic investment. Independent defense in ¡°our own way" is the most ineffective investment in the world.

This is neither a matter of reclaiming independence or having it taken away, nor of injury to one¡¯s national pride. In any case, I tend to think we should sometimes be able to adjust the priorities and accept a situation where for the sake of a greater goal we put up with a minor injury to our pride. On the assumption that the U.S. or any other ally, by the same token, has no political motive for controlling or subjugating us by taking advantage of the alliance, security cooperation is merely a question of effectiveness, tangible benefit and economics.

But the Roh administration treats the issue entirely from the angle of national independence and pride. Roh seems indignant still that an allied Chinese general forced a Korean general to kneel during Hideyoshi Toyotomi¡¯s invasion of Korea in the 16th century. That is why he seems to think we have to exercise operational command of our own troops. Of course, nobody likes to see one of our generals prostrate himself, but it is a historical fact that the kowtow, humiliating as it was, saved Chosun from Japanese occupation.

Yet Roh¡¯s interview on Wednesday gave no inkling of any ardor to safeguard the Republic. He rather gives the impression that he wants to take over operational control lest the U.S. should wage war on the Korean Peninsula or, more specifically, take military action against North Korea. His words and deeds show him more concerned about the North than the South, and give the impression of an opportunistic tactician stirring national sentiment.

The questions of sole operational control of our troops, the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the future of the Seoul-Washington alliance cannot be determined by any government at will. Other policy matters can be corrected by way of legislation once the administration changes. But our security and Korea-U.S. relations, once set on one course or another, cannot be changed like that. Their nature will not permit us to beg for another chance. If national security crumbles, the nation is ruined.

This is therefore too important an issue to be left to the Roh administration. Article 72 of the Constitution stipulates, "The president may, when necessary, call a national referendum on important policy involving foreign relations, national defense, unification and other matters concerning the fate of the state." Many people now believe that operational control is such a matter, and they are right.

The president must therefore call a referendum, especially since his own conviction in the matter is so much firmer than that of any of his predecessors. A president so convinced should not even need anyone telling him to call a referendum.

Roh is a minority president struggling with the lowest approval rating ever for a Korean chief executive. He is a lame duck with barely over a year to go. His party has been routed by the electorate in every recent election. If the head of such an administration attempts to railroad through a matter that determines the fate of the nation based on nothing but his own opinion and sheer obstinacy, his actions will backfire.