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President Roh Moo-hyun told Chinese President Hu Jintao in a telephone conversation on Friday evening the concerned countries need to make a ¡°firm decision¡± to resolve the North Korean missile crisis diplomatically by preventing the situation from escalating and reopening the six-party talks on the North¡¯s nuclear program. Cheong Wa Dae says the remarks were ¡°not targeted at any particular country.¡±
The president is of course welcome to ask other parties to make sure the situation does not escalate. But the issue is diplomatically delicate, and great caution is needed in determining who the South Korean president should be talking to, and about what. Otherwise, there are likely to be diplomatic misunderstandings that could deepen Seoul¡¯s sense of isolation in the matter. That is why it is difficult to take Cheong Wa Dae¡¯s account of the conversation at face value.
Said to have come at Seoul's request, the chat lasted for 30 minutes. By contrast, the chief executive had a 10-minute talk with his American counterpart on the matter and none with the Japanese prime minister. That the president telephoned his Chinese counterpart and called for a "firm decision¡± to reach a diplomatic solution at a time when the U.S. and Japan are looking to take additional sanctions against the North could give the impression that he is asking Beijing to restrain Washington and Tokyo ? in other words, as a step toward forming a South Korea-China camp to counter the U.S.-Japan line.
If that is the plan, it would be a grave misjudgment. In adopting the UN Security Council resolution on North Korea, the U.S. and China agreed on a major principle for dealing with the North Korean missile question. The two powers are moving within the framework of that agreement. However hard our president may try to persuade the Chinese president over the phone, he cannot alter the course China has taken. It is also naïve to think that the U.S. can be restrained by way of China.
This government often seems to act based on the misunderstanding that America and China are on a collision course. Thus it opposed "strategic flexibility" for the U.S. Forces Korea out of paranoia that the USFK could become embroiled in a clash between the U.S. and China over Taiwan once it has the license to operate abroad. The infamous call for South Korea to play the role of a ¡°balancer¡± was also based on a scenario where Seoul would keep a greater distance from the U.S. and approach closer to China if the two face off.
China's GDP last year stood at US$2.2 trillion, one-sixth of the U.S.'s $12.5 trillion, and its defense outlays in 2004 were $35.4 billion, one-13th of the U.S.'s $455.3 billion. China does not nearly have the economic and military power to confront the U.S. yet. Beijing itself apparently intends to foster its powers by adapting to a U.S.-centered order for at least another 20 years. It is only the South Korean government that sees Beijing confronting Washington.
Under these circumstances, Seoul is a little foolish when it talks about South Korea-U.S. cooperation to Washington but schemes to restrain America with China¡¯s help behind its back. That way, it will hardly find a ready ear in Washington if it proposes to resolve the missile crisis in Korea's own way. This diplomatic adventurism is turning South Korea into an international orphan.
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