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The commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, Gen. Burwell Bell, on Thursday told a National Assembly security forum that ways are being studied to create separate commands when Seoul regains wartime operational control of its troops. Bell was quoted as saying that to maintain the deterrent once Korea has full control of its forces and to secure capabilities to win a war, three questions should be answered: What are the wartime objectives? What is the level of U.S. support needed? And what will returning full operational control mean for compliance with the armistice agreement?
If North Korea invades the South, Bell is asking, will Seoul¡¯s objective be defending the armistice line or destroying the North Korean regime? It is a natural question, borne of a sense that Seoul and Washington should share the same goal if they are to fight together. It is especially natural given how allergic this administration is to Combined Forces Command's efforts to craft an operational plan that would seem to threaten the North Korean regime.
If Seoul is indeed ready to safeguard its security under its own steam, Bell is asking, how much U.S. help will it need? The question goes to whether military intelligence support alone, for instance, will be sufficient, or whether air and naval support will be needed, and so forth. In short, it questions whether South Korea can go it alone. In that sense, it is the same as the question from an ex-defense minister and ruling-party lawmaker a while ago: "Are we ready to take back the wartime operational command in five to six years? Do we have satellites? Do we have an early-warning system in place? Do we have a missile defense system?"
Lastly, Bell asks, given that UN Command remains in name only once Combined Forces Command is dissolved, how will we be able to maintain the armistice arrangements? Under the armistice, the southern side is represented by the UNC and the northern side by North Korea and China. Even minor trespasses in the truce village of Panmunjom require UNC instructions to resolve. In the end, we will need something like a peace treaty to replace the armistice. Have inter-Korean relations progressed to that stage?
If we are to take back operational control, we have to deal with these questions, which go to the heart of our security. Given our capabilities, there is no easy answer. Bell will therefore have been anxious to know if the South Korean government is thinking about them while it pushes ahead with taking full control of its troops.
Of the seven missiles North Korea launched, the long-range Taepodong-2 missile failed, Bell reminded us, but the remaining six Scud and Rodong missiles were accurate. The North has 800 of them, so it is more important to secure defense capabilities against them than to speculate how it intends to use them.
The government must answer these questions. They are not Bell¡¯s alone but those of the people. We don¡¯t need to hear the naive hypothesis that no North Korean nuclear weapons or missiles target the South. We need clear evidence that we are capable of coping with the North¡¯s military strength, which may include nuclear weapons and certainly includes hundreds of missiles, in addition to any chemical and biological warfare technology, and whatever its intentions for them may be.
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