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The former defense minister and Uri Party lawmaker Cho Seong-tae told the National Assembly on Thursday any schedule for the return of wartime operational control of troops to Korea must come second to ensuring that war risks have clearly been removed from the Korean Peninsula. He was referring to Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung¡¯s remark that Korea is likely to regain wartime control from the U.S. by 2012. ¡°Even if the president said it, the defense minister should advise him against it; if that is not acceptable, he should resign. The situation is almost unbearably critical," Cho said.
"Are you confident of retrieving wartime operational control in five to six years? Do we have satellites, early warning system and Aegis systems to intercept missiles in mid-flight?" Cho asked Yoon.
The same question was asked a while ago by the U.S. Forces Korea commander, Gen. Burwell Bell. Is South Korea prepared now to get wartime operational command back, he asked. People capable of appraising the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Korean forces' current capabilities like Rep. Cho and Gen. Bell, are bound to ask the question.
Yoon replied, "We judge that in about five years we should be able to get ready somehow to achieve that objective." If we get wartime operational command returned to us in five years, as envisaged in the government's timetable, Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command would be dissolved. The whole idea is predicated on dismantling the security system on which the Republic of Korea has survived for 60 years. When our defense minister thinks we should nonetheless ¡°somehow¡± be ready, it is no wonder that one of his predecessors feels the situation is almost unbearable.
The precariousness of the security situation in Korea is expressed in an op-ed column in the Thursday issue of the Washington Post, written by William Perry and Ashton Carter, who were secretary and assistant secretary of Defense under president Clinton. "If North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched," they said. "North Korea could respond to U.S. resolve by taking the drastic step of threatening all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. But it is unlikely to act on that threat. An invasion of South Korea would bring about the certain end of Kim Jong-il's regime within a few bloody weeks of war, as surely he knows."
Perry and Carter casually mention "a few bloody weeks of war," but that could indeed turn the Korean Peninsula into a "sea of fire." Millions of people in the two Koreas could be killed. It is unbelievable that Perry, who served as North Korea nuclear coordinator under Clinton, could make such an irresponsible remark.
White House national security adviser Stephen Hadley denied the possibility of a preemptive attack. "We think diplomacy is the right answer, and that is what we are pursuing." But that statement alone is not enough to quell all concerns. During the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis, too, the U.S. administration officially denied plans for preemptive air strikes. But it was confirmed later that specific preparatory steps were being taken.
The real concern is whether our government has grasped the U.S. administration's real intention, and if so, if it has the means of dissuading the U.S. from making that dangerous choice. The U.S. has not told our government whether it has Aegis destroyers in the East Sea to intercept the missile. That is about the measure of trust the two allies enjoy.
As it rushes headlong into reclaiming wartime operational control at a cost of hundreds of trillions of won, does our government have any steps in mind to deal with this critical security situation at hand?
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