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The so-called "important proposal" formulated as a means of resolving the North Korean nuclear dispute calls for South Korea to supply electricity directly to the North, the government disclosed Tuesday. The proposal envisages that we shoulder the entire economic burden for solving the nuclear dispute and that other countries including the United States merely provide security guarantees for the regime.
The energy aid is a fair offer if the North does not resume the light-water reactor project it was promised under a 1994 agreement. Power lines to the North, the government says, can be laid with money we would save on building the reactors. Although the cost of 2 million kw electricity a year to be supplied to the North will have to be calculated separately, the proposal is worth looking at since South Korea reportedly has an electricity surplus.
But some aspects of the offer need closer examination. First of all, the plan wants us to start laying power lines once the North "agrees" to dismantle its nuclear development program. Now, the North continued with its nuclear development despite a pledge to freeze it in the 1994 Geneva Accords, and went off on its current nuclear adventure when the violation was discovered.
As a result, any subsequent project predicated on a North Korean promise alone is likely to be problematic. Well, some may say, if the North violates the accord, we can suspend the project or not supply electricity. But facilities built by then would become North Korean property. Moreover, power is a "strategic good" and essential for the recovery of the North Korean economy. Thus we need to make a careful strategic judgment whether or not to supply large quantities of electricity to the North. Does the government plan take into account all long-term prospects for inter-Korean relations?
The main question is how Pyongyang will respond to the proposal. Chances are it will concentrate on problems with the U.S. and not commit itself on the proposal one way or the other, while trying to milk the situation for maximum political and economic compensation. If our government then bustles in urging other participants in the talks to show their sincerity while it shoulders the economic burden, it would merely disrupt the united front the parties must present to the North. Seoul must watch North Korea¡¯s attitude with a cool head, and make sure it can win national consensus for its offer.
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