Updated Jun.20,2005 23:02 KST

Korea Needs a 'New Military'

Eight Die, Two Hurt as Soldier Runs Amok in DMZ
What Broke Down Military Discipline?
DMZ Killing Spree 'Was Premeditated'
Unanswered Questions in DMZ Killing Spree
Killing Spree at DMZ Division Not the First
Killer Attempted Escape After DMZ Rampage
Killer Sorry for Families of 'Innocent Victims'
The private who committed Sunday¡¯s killing spree at a frontline guard post was driven to it by verbal abuse from a senior soldier, we are told. But that a young man who joined the military after having been found physically and mentally fit could be touched off one day to commit an atrocity of such proportions cannot be attributed to problems with an individual soldier. Similar incidents, if not on such a scale, take place in the Army all the time. We can no longer put off the task of a comprehensive overhaul of military discipline, management and organization culture.

The armed forces don't exist outside the flow of social change. Above all, the young who join the military today are not the young of the past. There exist some fundamental differences that cannot be glossed over with conventional reference to the generation gap. These are new people: their thinking is quite different from their parents¡¯, as are their patterns of behavior and values. Most of them, for instance, are only sons who lack the socialization larger families provide. Though they have enjoyed parental love, they have never shared the love of brothers and sisters. Such youngsters put themselves above anything else in setting their values, and they are that much less likely to think of sacrificing themselves for an organization. By the same token, they are less skilled in resolving conflicts with their comrades-in-arms.

Existing methods of training and discipline have reached their limit in producing a strong armed force from a group of such people. To organize a military from "new people", we must develop new training methods and leadership that foster in them the roots of the military spirit while meeting their needs.

To begin with, the ratio of non-commissioned officers who can look after enlisted men and who can act as counselors for them is too low. While a U.S. artillery battalion has 520-plus enlisted men against 250-odd NCOs, it is said, the Korean equivalent with a full strength of 350-plus has less than 40 NCOs. That number must be increased, because NCOs have a vital role to play in lieu of parents or older brothers.

If we are to help the new people turn into new soldiers, we need a thorough study of what should be changed and what should be created. To that end, we may need a whole new body that is not limited to the military but also includes the government and members of the public.