Updated May.18,2005 15:15 KST

Korea's Need for a New National Identity by David Kang
In the past year, Japan has been increasingly causing friction with Korea. Whether it is Japanese claims to own Tokto island, Japan¡¯s unwillingness to truly own up to its history, or its decision to take a more active and muscular foreign policy, Korea-Japan relations have recently faced a number of problems. While some of this is undoubtedly Japan¡¯s fault, fault also lies with Korea, for allowing Japan to provoke Korea. Japan¡¯s ability to cause outrage in Koreans is more a sign of how Korea sees itself than how Japan sees Korea. For Korea to truly become a responsible middle power in the region and the world, it will have to change its own conception of itself -- that is, Korea will have to adjust its national identity.

The deeper issue is that Korea does not have a clear concept of its national identity. Indeed, Korea¡¯s national identity is mired in the past. For the past fifty years, South Korean identity has been based on the ¡°three nots¡±: South Korea was not North Korea, it was not Japan, and it was not the United States. This comparison (¡°South Korea=good, North Korea=bad¡±) has been the main way in which South Korean viewed themselves. However, such a negative national identity provides little guidance for what foreign policies South Korea should follow, especially when South Korea now is an advanced capitalist democracy and one of the largest countries in the world. This identity also unnecessarily keeps South Koreans focused on historical issues that have little chance of resolution, but still harm current relations with its important allies, and provides little cushion for South Korea when there actually is an international issue that needs resolution. This deeper issue is ultimately more important for Korea than is who owns Tokto or what Japan¡¯s textbooks say, or finding Japanese collaborators from the 1920s. Koreans should stop letting Japan dictate the terms of their relationship. Regardless of Japan¡¯s actions, refusing to let go of the past restricts South Korea¡¯s ability to forge healthy relations with an important neighbor. Focusing on the negative aspects of the U.S. relationship keeps South Korea in a reactive mode, as well. History is important, of course -- but we need a government, and popular, reaction that is more balanced in consideration of national interests and what really helps Korea. Focusing too much on history gets in the way of solving the nuclear issue, dealing with a rising China, continuing mutually beneficial economic and cultural exchanges between Japan and Korea, and keeping the U.S. alliance strong -- all of which will require a strong sense of what Korea's values and interests actually are."

The one area that has recently seen a change in South Korea¡¯s conception of its national interest has been its relations with the North. In the past decade, South Korea began to formulate a positive image and role for itself by rethinking relationship to North Korea. No longer does South Korea define itself as the opposite of the North, but rather it has begun to define itself as the ¡°relative¡± of the North - gently prodding the North to change from a position of friendliness, not fear. Although there has been intense criticism of South Korea¡¯s willingness to continue an engagement strategy with the North, what the critics overlook is that South Korea has finally begun - after fifty years - to reimagine its relationship with the North. And utimately, if South Korea hopes to become a responsible nation in the world, it will have to rethink how it fits into the rest of the world, and most particularly its relations with its important neighbors.

In a way, it¡¯s not surprising that South Korea has first begun to change its national identity with respect to North Korea. Not only do they share a common history and culture, but by any measure -- economic, political, cultural, or diplomatic -- South Korea won the competition with the North. So it¡¯s easier for South Korea to be magnanimous with the North. Those who think that the South should take offense at every tiny provocation that the North pulls are playing right into North Korea¡¯s hands, and still think of South and North Korea as equals. This is most certainly not the case -- the South has won, and it¡¯s not a big deal what North Korea does, or even if they spend a few million dollars a year in luring the North into capitalism.

And although South Korea has laudably begun to rethink its relations with the North, South Korea unfortunately still defines itself shrilly -- and in opposition to -- Japan and the United States. Such a worldview has negative consequences for South Koreans themselves, and for formulating a foreign policy. Even compared to Japan, South Korea has no reason to feel insecure. Japan has absolutely no chance of pulling off another military invasion of Korea - those days are long gone. In economic terms, although Japan is very big, South Korean standards of living, production, and technology are all competitive with and sometimes even superior to those of Japan. But why even make the comparison? Who cares what Japanese think? South Koreans should focus more on who they are and what they want, rather than what their neighbors think.

Japan¡¯s baffling inability to deal with its past is not Korea¡¯s problem. Japan has always been an insular society, based more on a sense of uniqueness than shared kinship with continental Asia. Although this is an obviously harmful viewpoint, it¡¯s up to the Japanese to change it, not Koreans or Chinese. For its part, insecurity is not a positive basis for a national identity, and South Korea will have to develop a national identity based on a more clearly articulated sense of what Korea stands for, not who it stands against.

David Kang
Associate Professor, Government Department, Dartmouth College