Updated May.12,2005 22:49 KST

When Dealing With North Korea, Assume the Worst

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North Korea's Foreign Ministry said Wednesday the country successfully removed 8,000 spent fuel rods from the nuclear power station in Yongbyon. "We have been taking steps to increase our nuclear arsenal,¡± it added. Reprocessing of spent fuel rods produces weapons-grade plutonium.

The announcement adds nothing we did not suspect and therefore hardly represents a qualitative change in the nuclear dispute. But the countries involved in getting North Korea to give up its nuclear arms program are now concentrating their efforts to revive the six-party talks amid talk that the North is preparing to test a nuclear bomb.

That the North has taken another provocative step at this time proves that it wants the crisis to deepen, though it is not clear whether it will go all the way and test an atomic bomb or whether it hopes to come back to the talks once it has secured U.S. concessions. As the Chinese Communist Party¡¯s foreign affairs chief Wang Jiarui said, even Kim Jong-il himself may be vacillating between getting the bomb and disarmament.

If Pyongyang thinks it is in control so long as it can arbitrarily adjust the level of tension, it miscalculates dangerously. Washington and Tokyo have offered no particular response this time, indicating that they won't be dragged into Pyongyang's schemes. That means the North will have to ratchet up the danger yet again if it wants to provoke a response.

For this sort of tightrope walk, North Korea needs the nerves not only to know its own capabilities but also to sense from where the wind is blowing. Are North Korea¡¯s internal economic and political conditions stable enough to sustain a nuclear venture? Has Kim Jong-il secured the internal status and leadership he needs to handle the dispute based on his own judgment? Does Pyongyang accurately understand how much U.S. policy toward it and the international community's perception of it have changed, and continue to change as we speak?

Any calamity resulting from a shortcoming in any one of these areas will not be confined to the North but will hit the entire Korean Peninsula. We can no longer afford to second-guess North Korea¡¯s intentions and capabilities. We need a comprehensive response based on the worst-case scenario now.