The White House warned, "North Korea's nuclear test will be regarded as a provocative act," while a senior U.S. administration official said, "If North Korea tests a nuclear device, South Korea would sustain a serious blow, including an over 50 percent plunge in share prices."

It is being confirmed that a tunnel being built in Kilju, North Hamgyeong Province, North Korea and a nearby reviewing stand cannot but be regarded as facilities meant for a nuclear test. There can be no explanation, it is said, other than that the facilities have either one of two purposes: for the North to test a nuclear device or convey to the outside world that it is preparing for such a test. It appears evident that the North intends to use a nuclear test as a direct or indirect negotiation card with the United States.

If it schemed to use a nuclear test card for a broader transaction with the U.S., however, Pyongyang should realize that this is a complete misjudgment. A North Korean nuclear test will provide material evidence that the North has clearly crossed the "red line" the U.S. and international community have set up with regard to the North Korean nuclear dispute.

Once North Korea has crossed the red line, the U.S. and international community wouldn't be able to engage in give-and-take negotiation with the North, even if they wanted to. The negotiation table, instead of being expanded as the North wishes, would be overturned.

Should a North Korean nuclear test be realized, the three principles for the resolution of the nuclear standoff that this government has regarded as a “golden rule” would collapse. A nuclear test by the North would break the first principle, "North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons won't be tolerated," while the second principle, "The North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully"; and the third, "The South Korean government will positively resolve the issue," would crumble at the same time.

With the remaining course of the North Korean nuclear issue confined to direct confrontation between Washington and Pyongyang, Seoul would become a complete bystander. China, which along with the Seoul government has volunteered to play the role of coordination and arbitration between North Korea and the U.S., will lose justification to restrain the U.S.

While this government has coped with the nuclear issue with easy-going perceptions such as "North Korea's nuclear development has reason," "North Korea's nuclear development is for use in negotiations," and, "A North Korean nuclear test is a presumption based on a possibility," the nuclear dispute has continued deteriorating. And the worst-case scenario of a nuclear test is lurking before our eyes.

Since its inauguration over two years ago, the government has set the resolution of the North Korean nuclear standoff as its top-priority national administration task, and the president displayed his sense of confidence only a month ago, saying, "(The North Korean nuclear issue) is set to be resolved." When the top official in charge of national administration made the remarks, he should have had plausible grounds on which to do so.

Using as a lever the inter-Korean relationship of trust it claims to have created through its unilateral cajoling of North Korea, the government must plainly convey to Pyongyang that, "A nuclear test would result in calamity."

(englishnews@chosun.com )