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On Monday U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, while visiting Seoul on the first leg of his three-country tour of Korea, China and Japan, met with senior Korean government officials. On that day Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said, "If North Korea goes through with a nuclear test, it will start along a road where the future cannot be guaranteed."
The New York Times reported the U.S. government was considering a UN resolution empowering nations to intercept shipments in or out of a particular country that may contain nuclear materials or components -- a measure clearly aimed at North Korea, the daily added. "If the U.S. wants to drag the nuclear issue before the UN Security Council, let it go ahead," a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman responded. "We'll consider (U.S.) sanction a declaration of war."
Since all this was happening on a single day, we have to conclude that the North Korean nuclear dispute is entering a very serious stage. How different from when President Roh Moo-hyun declared only a fortnight ago, "North Korea is ready to abandon its nuclear development program. This problem will be resolved so long as the U.S. or North Korea don¡¯t entertain other schemes or tell a lie."
That the foreign minister has come out expressing concern about a possible nuclear test is extraordinary, given that his government¡¯s official position is that any nuclear devices Pyongyang may have are primitive and the country is nowhere near a stage where it can conduct a test. But that has changed abruptly with Hill's visit here. Nonetheless, pressure on the North is undesirable: that has been the clear message from the president and his people, who pride themselves on their dexterous management of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Despite that, Washington takes it as a fait accompli that it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council, and is even mulling what in effect would be a blockade of North Korea.
There is, then, too great a gap between the government¡¯s easy-going attitude and the tense reality. No wonder the public feels confused. To what extent, it asks, has North Korea developed nuclear devices? Is there any possibility the North will return to the six-party talks? If it does not, how does the international community including the U.S. plan to pressure it? Will South Korea take part in these efforts, or will it shield the North and take sides with China?
The fate of the nation and its people is staked on the issue. The government therefore has the duty to give the public a realistic picture, even if it is unable to reveal specific details. Blithe optimism, which is bound to turn out unwarranted, only fosters distrust.
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