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In a report submitted to the U.S. Senate, Admiral William J. Fallon, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, said the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger than it has ever been, and that the alliance between Washington and Tokyo was the most important U.S. treaty in the Pacific region. He said Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro believed in the alliance and was showing remarkable leadership. Only then did he turn to Korea.
The difference in importance to U.S. national interests of Japan and Korea is not new. The three-way relationship has not put Korea at a disadvantage in the 50 years or so since it has been thus imbalanced, and despite the differences in importance, the Korea-U.S. alliance has been stronger than the Japan-U.S. alliance because the U.S. fought the Korean War and Korea sent troops to Vietnam.
After World War II, the Free World order in Northeast Asia was built on the two pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Korea-U.S. alliance, and while there was no official alliance between Korea and Japan, due to their common ally in the U.S., the two closely cooperated in terms of security. But a growing number of people are getting the feeling that over the last couple of years centripetal forces between the U.S. and Japan have led to a strengthening of the Washington-Tokyo axis, while centrifugal forces have been forcing Washington and Seoul further apart.
Some even believe the six-party talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue are split four to two, with North and South Korea, China and Russia on one side and the U.S. and Japan on the other. Subtle differences between the U.S. and Korea over how to resolve the issue or the differences in opinion about the U.S. role in the talks are being taken as signs of these qualitative differences in the bilateral and three-way relationship.
If the three-way relationship between Korea, the U.S. and Japan has changed thusly since the Roh administration took power, we face a grave change in one of the factors that has sustained the nation over the last 50 years. The change in the three-way relationship not only signifies changes in the common security basis between the three, but in the economic relationships and the path to unification, it could also bring great changes to the amount of policy options Korea has to choose from.
If that is indeed the case, then perhaps we ought to be told. If indeed the government¡¯s ¡°independent diplomacy¡± and ¡°independent defense¡± mean an attempt to shake one of the pillars on which Korea has based its survival, then it cannot continue to be an understanding within the government, but must be discussed broadly with the people. If such a strategic choice were left to simple expressions like ¡°Let¡¯s move the Korea-U.S. relationship to an independent one¡± or ¡°Let¡¯s get along better with China,¡± there would be a great danger that the fate of Korea could fall in the trap created by the qualitative differences between the Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japanese alliances.
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