The U.S. has sent its military to countless nations to fight and keep the peace. Korea was unique because thanks to U.S. protection it was able to establish a democracy and experience economic rebirth. Because Germany and Japan were aggressor nations that lost the war, their cases were different. In the case of Europe, the U.S. did not act alone and of its own volition. In places like the Philippines, democracies were set up but their once promising economies crashed. Korea, then, is for the U.S. and Americans a rare showcase of the actualization of the American ideal. That is why the U.S. is proud of Korea.

In this feeling of pride, however, a crack has appeared. Perhaps the country was too close to U.S. hearts for them to notice that Korea was growing. There is also a generational shift in the U.S., which has its own “386 generation” - like its Korean counterpart it thinks of the Korean War as ancient history.

The “U.S. 386ers” - those now in their 30s and 40s who were born in the 1960s and graduated in the 1980s - believe that if Koreans see the U.S. as a factor of insecurity for Korea, the U.S. no longer need embrace it. They already see the six-party talk structure on North Korea's nuclear program as not a three-on-three with the U.S., South Korea and Japan on one side and North Korea, China and Russia on the other, but as a two-on-four setup: South Korea isn’t on the U.S. side, they believe, but on the “other side.” They believe that U.S. troops in Korea are a hangover from the time when China and the former Soviet Union were enemies of the U.S., and since Beijing and Moscow have become partners of Washington, the justification and need for their continued presence on the peninsula have greatly decreased. Washington, they say, must readjust its troop commitments to match the new situation and environment.

Seoul and Pyongyang both must approach the North Korean nuclear issue and the six-party talks within this changed context. We must understand that as Korea’s position and the thoughts of the Korean government have changed, the U.S. will no longer unconditionally lend an ear to Korea’s demands, nor will it lay its innermost intentions open to us. It is also becoming more likely that Washington could conclude a deal with North Korea or another third country without consulting Seoul. I think if Kim Jong-il were to become a little more flexible, accept reform and show signs of interest in the human rights issue, a U.S. deal with the North would not be unthinkable.

North Korea’s nuclear declaration and refusal to participate in the six-party talks could be seen as shortsighted: Pyongyang misread the changes of the age. Bush’s re-election and the success of the Iraqi general election are giving the U.S. space. In its relationship with South Korea, it is becoming more objective and independent. Ahead of the Olympics and Shanghai Expo, China does not want insecurity in Asia. Driving Japan down a blind alley and putting China and the U.S. in a difficult and confusing position is to miss a good opportunity. Sources had been predicting that, as in the last round of six-party talks, direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea would be possible, even if they weren’t of an open and official nature, and it’s difficult to understand how the North could give up on all that.

What then is North Korea’s true intention? Is it perhaps that it doesn’t want the six-party talks, direct talks with the U.S., or to overcome its economic difficulties, but instead has become obsessed with the false dream of making its way through the world based on the nuclear threat? Perhaps it is turning its back on the world out of despair. When I look at the course of the Kim Jong-il regime, which one can neither know nor understand, my uncertainty is boundless.