President Roh Moo-hyun, in the course of stressing a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and Korea's leading role in carving this brave new future, declared that Seoul "does not want to see North Korea collapse," hammering home his point that the nation will not tolerate any U.S. policy that involves using force to break down the Stalinist regime.

The first point that needs to be clarified is that the collapse of North Korea and a regime change are by no means one and the same thing. Collapse signifies ruination on a national, economic and administrative scale, while regime change merely denotes a shift in power away from Dear Leader Kim Jong-il and his self-imposed cult of personality. The disappearance of Kim and his cronies and the overall implosion of a struggling nation are clearly separate issues.

Just as North Korea's existence does not hinge solely on the governance of the Kim Jong-il regime - despite decades of state-controlled propaganda there claiming the reverse - those who discuss the notion of a "regime change" in the North are not really advocating the nation's collapse. It is equally short-sighted to suggest that replacing Kim's regime would foster and assist a greater risk of war on the Korean Peninsula.

We have to observe the problem of regime change in the North - which would depend on both internal and external factors taking their toll - on these premises.

From an external point of view, the world's ability to use military pressure and the potential consequences of this are evident in the case of Iraq. However, Iraq survived blanket bombing, administrative chaos and mass insurrection yet managed to survive. It has not vanished from the world map.

Being directed from outside, the power change in Iraq cannot, however, be called typical. Most examples of regime change occur as a bubbling over of internal factors within the troubled state itself, either through democratic or revolutionary means. From palace coups to parliamentary votes, they are theoretically unlimited, whereas external factors are restricted, with the level of intervention being reined in by international accords such as a United Nations resolution.

What concrete form such external factors may make in relation to the North is difficult to imagine given the present circumstances, aside from a possible decision by Washington to apply force should the reclusive state pursue its nuclear armament program or tread the diplomatic tightrope of enlarging on its experimentation in this field.

The George W. Bush administration has repeatedly stressed its policy of finding a resolution to the North Korean nuclear standoff within the framework of the six-party talks. This was officially confirmed at the bilateral meeting of the Korean and U.S. leaders in Santiago, Chile. The U.S. national security advisor-designate, Stephen Hadley, also re-confirmed it Tuesday.

The U.S. administration appears to have adopted a strategy of employing diplomatic rhetoric to keep its options open regarding any extreme situations that may arise, yet it has never deviated from a peaceful approach. Whatever aggressive moves some American neo-cons may be advocating, there is no sign that the Bush administration has accepted any of them.

As far as the North is concerned, South Korea is neither privy to any political changes that have arisen from the state's internal factors, nor do we have any room to intervene. Seoul is not in a position to issue demands. Given the severity and relentlessness of the hunger, fear and bondage now prevailing in the North, we can only hope for signs of improvement given the North's abysmal human rights record, even though we secretly acknowledge that making such a wish is an exercise in futility. The stark reality is that we are powerless to help.

So the burning question is, Why must President Roh Moo-hyun repeatedly insist that North Korea will not collapse and arbitrating nations must seek a "peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue" ad infinitum every time he makes an overseas trip? It would arguably have been sufficient for him to nail down his viewpoints once or twice.

If Bush had referred to the likelihood of regime change in the North or specifically mentioned a future invasion, Roh's defensive stance would be more comprehensible as a means of lodging a softly-nuanced objection. But for Roh to try and preemptively block calls for regime change when the situation does not warrant it, and to bristle at the private remarks by some neocons in America, while portraying the United States as a "touch customer," is simply not prudent or even appropriate given the Korea-U.S.' longstanding alliance.

If President Roh's remarks aimed at dismissing the prospect of the North's collapse were interpreted as his indirect support for the Kim Jung-il system and a desire to see no further instability stem from internal factors, there are no grounds for taking this as a reflection of the widely held views of the Korean people. One could even go so far as to call it an interference in domestic affairs.

Were the remarks aimed at soliciting favors from the Kim Jong-il regime, this approach would not only seem dangerous but naive and futile. The North Korean authorities would prefer a South Korean leader of clout who can build trust with the U.S. president and influence the U.S. government and its people. After all, it is the Bush administration that the Kim Jong-il regime pays most attention to. Not Roh.