We may deduce two conclusions from nuclear history. First, a country wishing to possess nuclear weapons must be ranked among the powers. A nuclear country should possess national strength or military might to safeguard itself. North Korea sustains itself only on the back of "cliff-edge diplomacy" accompanied by threats and intimidations. Second, small countries wishing to hold nuclear weapons must line up properly depending on Cold-War axes. Libya's Moammar Gadhafi once lined up safely, but had to take his hands off nuclear weapons because he lined up wrong when the Cold War era came to an end.

In which case would South Korea fall into? Of course, we are not in a position to discuss the possession of nuclear weapons. Given the circumstances under which South Korea nonetheless is censored by the world over such minor tests, we may perhaps fall under the case of lining up wrong or having changed lines. The core of the nuclear issue is who, or namely, what sort of a leader or what kind of regime possesses nuclear substances. From the standpoint of a great power grasping world order, nuclear substances in the hands of its allies do not matter much; once they fall into the hands of hostile forces, they are subject to merciless retaliation.

The belated issue making of the "insignificant" and "old" tests, according to the cold logic of great powers, indicates that South Korea, to their eyes, is no longer its ally. The United States may have judged that, though it has overlooked occasional "tampering" with nuclear substances, it was necessary to send a warning in light of the leftist bent of the Roh administration.

This might be only the beginning. Were we to assert "nationalism" and "anti-Americanism," we should have prepared ourselves more thoroughly. The United States and particularly neoconservatives began to call the Roh administration "Taliban" and "Red Guards." The U.S.-based Capital Group, one of the world's biggest financiers, is now summoning CEOs of the country's conglomerates one by one to check how they plan to manage their funds. They have slowly begun to exercise their power as money owners. This is not ordinary. Economist Kong Byung-ho, in a book entitled "South Korea 10 Years Later," diagnosed, "Great power blocking South Korea's leftist bent will come surprisingly from foreign investors." It is not confined to the economy. There are moves in the United States, once Bush is re-elected, to generally review and totally renew South Korea policy, including security and the alliance.

Some look at the raising of Seoul's nuclear suspicions from a compound viewpoint. The view is expressed on an extension of a logic American neoconservatives used in mobilizing China for restraining North Korea's nuclear development program. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and others are said to have persuaded China, saying, "The United States is now restraining the nuclear development desires of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan to the maximum extent. If China does not restrain North Korea in a corresponding manner, the United States will find it difficult to bind South Korea, Japan and Taiwan much longer." The raising of South Korea's nuclear issue in the United States, according to this view, could be sort of an urging or demonstration addressed to China.

There is something we have to realize clearly from our current nuclear question. Granted, it is their own requirement, ethics and politics for the Roh administration to lock the open door from inside and indulge in reforms behind the closed door. We have to acknowledge the fact, however, that when we awaken ourselves sometime and look outside, we will find "the world" no loner. There will be no need whatsoever to lament over the Roh administration then. Before long we would apprehend that the German ambassador's description of South Korea as a country "standing alone" is not a simple observation of a diplomat.