U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless meets with the Chosun Ilbo for an exclusive interview Tuesday.

USFK reductions are not being carried out by the U.S. unilaterally. The size and timing of the reductions are both subjects of discussion between the U.S. and Korea. If we thought that the USFK reduction would harm Korea in the slightest, we would never have proposed it. We believe this plan is reasonable. We believe it carries no risk whatsoever to our capacity to deter war on the Korean Peninsula.

-- If the Korean government would like to reduce the size of the U.S. withdrawal, what would happen?

We are prepared to listen to whatever opinion Korea has. Concerning the USFK reduction, we haven't explained anything concrete yet, nor have we explained how it would proceed or which units would be reduced. In the coming few weeks, we will explain all this, after which Korea will send its response, and we will consider this response. Our proposal is linked to our strategic reinforcement plans in Asia. We think of Korea in the big picture.

-- Many Koreans think that because the Korea-U.S. relationship is not good, the U.S. sped up the timing of the USFK reduction. Why has the reduction plan been moved ahead of what was initially planned?

This is because of the Global Posture Review. In accordance with the release of the perfected GPR, we've worked hard to improve and develop plans related to Korea. When this issue was first raised a year ago, only an approximate picture existed. We imagined what would be in 2006 after we withdrew our troops in 2005, and we took confidence in this and made our plan. Moreover, when we started discussing USFK reductions through the Future of the Alliance Initiative talks, we didn't have as much confidence in our military capabilities as we do now. We were in the middle of the war in Afghanistan and preparing for the Iraq war. Through these experiences, we've gain confidence in our ability to respond quickly and precisely to situations. We made our proposal based on completely different background and knowledge than our concept from a year ago.

-- When one looks at how the USFK reduction was precisely presented at 12,500 men, doesn't this mean the units to be reduced have already been decided? If you reduce the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's artillery and aviation brigades, wouldn't this cause problems in our deterrence capabilities against the North?

-- The movement of troop strength is connected with battle capabilities. If the U.S. military is reorganized on the Korean Peninsula, we'll achieve economy of size. The capabilities of the U.S. will never deteriorate. If USFK is moved south of the Han River and brought together around a hub around Osan-Pyeongtaek, this would improve military efficiency. In ths situation, the fighting men would take on the character of a big support unit. Therefore, it is important that they be deployed smoothly in two hubs around Pyeongtaek and Osan.

I don't know whether USFK will be here for 50 or 100 years, but everything must be utilized to support USFK's continued stay. The base transfers and reorganization must go smoothly. Accordingly, we have said we need a sufficient amount of land, not a large amount. On our side, we are reorganizing USFK and establishing a new system for the sake of the Korea-U.S. alliance. But now, with our two sides asking whether the garrison transfer would be 3.6 million pyeong or 3.3 million pyong, and this petty thing becoming contentious, we are extremely confused and disappointed. I'm frustrated that in our 50-year relationship of alliance, a difference of 300,000 pyeong can become contentious.

-- In regards to the Yongsan Garrison transfer, if Korea doesn't provide additional land, isn't there also the possibility of an additional USFK reduction?

We requested a reasonable amount of land after researching the USFK reorganization for a long time, but for this [the land issue] to become a political issue leaves us frustrated. We will find a solution to this problem. But if this rational proposal is not accepted at the military level and instead develops into a political one, finding compromise might prove difficult.

If an agreement on the USFK reorganization is not led in a desirable direction, I think the people who will lose in the end are the Korean people. This is because we will not be able to augment our deterrence in Korea. We have a number of good concepts and plans like the additional deployment of the newest Patriot PAC-3 missiles. If a desirable reorganization doesn't come about, those good plans cannot be executed. Korea will miss an opportunity to improve its deterrent strength.

-- Would the delay in finding an agreement on the Yongsan Garrison transfer influence the U.S. decision to invest US$11 billion to upgrade USFK's fighting strength?

-- As additional fighting power couldn't come in and the reorganization of USFK wouldn't occur, it would inevitably influence that plan. If an agreement on a U.S. military reorganization is delayed, there's an even greater danger. This would be a loss of trust in the Korea-U.S. alliance on the part of both sides' citizens, and mistrust in the ability to maintain the alliance. Korean people understand from the Korean media that it's the U.S. that is delaying the Yongsan transfer agreement, and that the U.S. is asking for a huge amount of land. In fact, it's the Korean government that asked for Combined Forces and UN commands to remain at Yongsan. Therefore, we said let's stop arguing over the 110,000 pyeong of land in Yongsan. We said we'd move 100 percent of everything. If a USFK reorganization agreement cannot be reached, I worry that the alliance will lose the confidence and trust of both sides' citizens.

-- There are some who guess that after USFK reductions, the USFK command will be dismantled or placed under the command of U.S. forces in Japan.

There are no plans at all to change the command structure of USFK. As long as a threat from North Korea exists, that will never happen. We are not going to subordinate USFK to Japan or any other country. The current situation will continue. As long as there has not been an end to tensions through a North-South peace accord, North-South unification or a federal North-South government, a change in the command structure will not happen.

-- 8th U.S. Army commander Lt. Gen. Charles Campbell remarked that it's possible for an allied Korea-U.S. force to operate overseas.

We must first understand the idea of strategic flexibility. Strategic flexibility means not just taking fighting strength away from Korea, but also bringing in manpower to Korea. When he mentioned strategic flexibility, he didn't mean the U.S. military, together with the Korean military, being deployed overseas as an allied force. The U.S. has never considered having a combined Korea-U.S. force conducting activities overseas.

-- Would you like to say something to the Korean government or people?

We need to strongly maintain the Korea-U.S. alliance. While trusting and acknowledging one another, we must reorganize USFK and augment its military capabilities. This mustn't be politicized and it's important to maintain mutual trust. We wish to reorganize the U.S. military in order to strengthen the alliance and protect Korea more.

(Lee Ha-won, may2@chosun.com )

Who is Richard Lawless?

Even though he's a bureau head, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless has had a decisive influence on the security of the Korean Peninsula as the head U.S. negotiator in the Future of the Alliance Initiative talks that have been going on since last year. Big bilateral issues like the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division, Yongsan Garrison move and USFK reductions have been in his hands. In February of last year, he made our government nervous through his shock report that the 2nd Infantry Division would move south of the Han River, and last November, he officially asked out government to send troops to Iraq. As a specialist well versed in Korean affairs, he is proficient in the Korean language.