What's Happening Now With Our Iraq Deployment? 4,000 USFK Troops to Iraq U.S. Sending Troops Earmarked for Korea to Iraq U.S. to Send One USFK Brigade to Iraq No Security Vacuum After USFK Transfer: Ban

For some time, the press and experts repeatedly forecasted that there would be some changes happening for U.S. military troops stationed in Korea with the Iraq War in process. The Korean government, however, would only respond to this analysis by saying that there is no problem between the two countries, avoiding to directly comment on the issue. Since the beginning of the Bush administration, the Korean government has dodged the issue of relocating U.S. troops and alluding to matters relating to the size and role of the U.S. troops in Korea. Nevertheless, because things have led to the current situation, the Korean government must give direct answers to ease the people’s minds from doubts, uncertainties, and suspicions that have arised in relation to the present and future of Korean-U.S. relations and U.S. troops in Korea.

U.S. ground forces in Korea are the 28,000 men of the 2nd Infantry Division. According to press reports, among the three brigades of the 2nd Division, one of the three, which is now on stand-by waiting for its replacement from the main land, is to be dispatch to Iraq, while another brigade is to be withdrawn to the United States. This leaves only one infantry brigade in Korea. This could also mean that the size and character of the USFK in Korea has entered a critical new phase, the first since the 1970s when a division was withdrawn from Korea in accordance with President Nixon's “Guam doctrine.”

First of all, a practical question on the table is whether or not the brigade sent to Iraq would come back to Korea once the war in Iraq ends. If it does not return to Korea, we can say that an actual reduction and withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea is happening right at this moment. It is a matter of primary concern as to how the role of the one brigade left in Korea would change and how the Korean military would fill the vacuum.

When U.S. troops leave the duty of securing the Korean national boundaries but instead takes a new role as an air power-centered task force, a fundamental issue would be whether the Korean government has fully considered and prepared for the possible problems that might arise in the process. The most critical factor, however, is whether this reduction of U.S. troops in Korea would lead to the total withdrawal of U.S. troops in the future. The government must provide a precise answer to these questions.

Another concern is whether the Korean government went into a thorough discussion with the U.S. government concerning military reinforcements that are to take the position of the one brigade leaving for Iraq. Such a common-sense question seemed necessary as strange signs have appeared through various channels and on several levels. Some raised questions as to whether the whole process has been directed solely by the United States without making any sufficient preliminary announcements or agreements with the Korean government because of this atmosphere.

One thing that weighs on our minds is whether the forces that have been asserting “Anti-Americanism” and “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops” through the candlelight vigils and opposing the construction of a new U.S. Embassy, the moving of U.S. bases and shaking the basis of the relationship between Korea and the U.S. every time there is a pending bilateral issue have grown to be the core political base of this government. Another worry is whether this situation is related to the core government personalities that forecasted “qualitative changes in the relation between Korea and the U.S.”

If these changes in the U.S. military are included among the qualitative changes of the alliance between Korea and the U.S., we must ask what security and alliance alternatives to substitute for and suppliment these“qualitative changes" has the government prepared, adn what direction will it take from there.

Can an anxious nation trust that this government’s policy toward the U.S. and its alliances is the result of deep consideration concerning Korea’s path and strategies for defense?

Eventually all these issues come down to the question of how this government evaluates the meaning of the alliance between Korea and the United States. The alliance with the U.S. is the only alliance we have. Accordingly, changes in the Korea-U.S. alliance or amendments in the track will directly influence, of course, the “axis of diplomacy” and the “axis of national defense” that has been supporting independence and prosperity of Korea since our independence in 1945. It is evident that it will also influence the future path of the country.

Such suspicions and anxiety of the nation cannot be comforted with rhetoric like “independent crack military forces” or “cooperative autonomous national defense,” nor can the security gap resulting from qualitative changes in the alliance be hidden with empty rhetoric saying “alliance defensive abilities will be strengthened with close cooperation between Korea and the U.S.” by the ones who are in charge.

This government should boldly state its diplomatic paths and security direction and truthfully respond to the nation’s doubts. One thing to be emphasized at this point is that those in charge of this government should not think that a five-years term in office grants them the right to change and shift the diplomatic, defensive, and economic bases that were the pivots of Korea for the past 50 years for political reasons without the agreement of the people. What the people truly wish to hear is the government’s position about these criticisms.