Firstly, let me say that unlike a number of pundits, I have no problem with Seoul considering, first and foremost, its national interests when it finally decides on whether to send troops or not. The interests of the people of Iraq and world peace are all well and good, and definitely something we should strive for, but they are not something you base critical national decisions on, unless you are looking to court disaster. Yes, the people of Iraq need help, but so do a lot of people in the world - the security situation in the Congo is equally nasty, but I don't see anyone (besides those parties with an expressed interest in being there) rushing to send troops. The cold, hard fact is that nations do what's in their best interests, and that's especially the case when military options are being considered. I argued against the deployment of American troops to Liberia, and I still question the presence of American troops in the Balkans because I feel that the United States has few interests to protect in either region that are worth placing American troops in harm's way. I have also argued at my webpage (marmot.blogs.com/korea) quite consistently for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea because I felt that their presence here served no appreciable American interests. So I am not going to argue that South Korea should send its young men and women to Iraq for Middle East peace, "the children," or any other reason - no matter how admirable - other than that it's in Seoul's national interest to do so.

Likewise, I'm extremely uncomfortable with arguments to the effect that South Korea should dispatch troops to Iraq out of feelings of loyalty or gratitude to the United States. Whether or not South Koreans should feel such feelings about their No. 1 Ally is beside the point; like I stated above, sentiment is a very dangerous thing to base foreign policy decisions on, especially those with life and death consequences. Like any nation, South Korea needs to approach this issue with a cool-headed realism and ask itself whether the benefits of sending its forces into a hot situation like Iraq outweigh the drawbacks, not the least of which is the very real possibility that some of its young people will be coming home from the desert in body bags. With this in mind, I should also say that I do not resent that Seoul is taking its time with this decision. Roh Moo-hyun, after all, is ultimately responsible to the South Korean voters, not the United States, the United Nations or "world opinion." Now, statesmen often act contrary to domestic opinion when vital national interests are at stake, but those decisions are rarely easy or quickly arrived upon. To expect South Korea to make up its mind immediately on an issue like this is neither realistic nor fair. I'm not saying that Seoul should drag its feet on the issue - time is a factor, after all - but we should allow the South Korean government some space to both consider its decision and sell that decision to the public to which it's ultimately responsible.

Now that I've said that, let me say that I'm of the opinion that South Korea should send combat-ready forces to Iraq. First off, South Korea has as much interest in seeing a stable, democratic Iraq as the United States. More so, actually - unlike the United States, which has sizable oil reserves of its own, South Korea is almost entirely dependent on Middle Eastern oil imports, and I can't see how letting the region go to pot would be in South Korea's national interests. Instability in the Persian Gulf could very well strike at the heart of South Korea's economic lifeline, and it's of utmost importance to not only Washington, but also Seoul and Tokyo to see the American mission in Iraq succeed.

Of course, Korea may choose to play "free-rider" in Iraq - enjoying all the benefits of America's involvement there without actually having to get its own hands dirty. But doing so carries very real risks. Frankly, the U.S.-ROK relationship is in a hole, and despite the constant calls from the South Korean public for a "more equal relationship," the biggest danger facing the alliance is that the United States will eventually realize that the American-South Korean relationship, as it is currently structured, brings no benefits to the United States worth the costs of maintaining it. Right now, South Korea is not an "ally" in the commonly understood meaning of the word, but a protectorate - and a costly and potentially dangerous one at that. For the South Koreans, however, the U.S.-ROK alliance is their only real security guarantee; no multilateral security organization like NATO exists in Northeast Asia, and the peninsula is surrounded by more powerful and potentially hostile neighbors with long histories of imperial dominance over Korea. Of course, Korea could evolve itself into an Asian Switzerland - a neutral state that enforces its neutrality by arming itself to the teeth - but to do so would be costly and there is no guarantee that Korea's neighbors would respect its neutrality should a Great Power conflict erupt in the region. An alliance with the United States would seem to make sense, but to maintain the U.S.-ROK alliance would require a transformation of the relationship from one of patron-client to that of a true alliance between equals. For that to happen, there need to be attitude changes in both Washington and Seoul. For South Korea, it must ween itself off the teat of American power and show Washington how the ROK can be a useful ally, both regionally and globally. And if Seoul needed incentive, it should be kept in mind that Japan seems to be willing to transform itself into just such an ally, and I'm positive that getting stuck between China on one side and a Japan-U.S. alliance on the other can in no way be in South Korea's national interests.

There are also more mundane issues that can be addressed. South Korea has bragged about the prowess of its special forces, but frankly, the only way one can know for certain just how competent they are is to use them. In Korea, one often hears reference to "showing the world Korea's power," and here's a perfect opportunity for Koreans to do just that. The South Korean military has skills that may be useful in Iraq, and by exercising those skills, South Korean leaders and military officials can better gauge the effectiveness of the ROK's fighting men and make adjustments in doctrine should changes prove to be necessary. Moreover, by accepting such a high profile assignment, barring a major disaster, Korea's international standing cannot help but improve. South Korean influence in both Washington and the UN stands to increase dramatically, influence which in turn could be used to decide issues of even greater importance to South Korea's vital interests. And in the Middle East - both the sole source of South Korea's oil and a major target of South Korean investment - Seoul would gain a louder voice over how events played out (and not to be too blunt, but also a louder voice in how contracts for post-war reconstruction projects are parceled out).

In power politics, you've got to pay to play. South Korea, on the face of it, appears to have all the goods required to be a major player in world affairs. But if you're not willing to use those goods, you can't complain when other powers cut you out of the loop. A major project is currently underway in Iraq - a project that will impact Korea regardless of whether it succeeds or fails. An American defeat in Iraq carries with it profound dangers for Korea's economic well-being and security, while an American success in Iraq without South Korean support would not only be an opportunity wasted for Seoul, but call into question the utility of the entire ROK-U.S. alliance. If South Korea truly wishes to have an "equal relationship" with the United States, then Iraq is the perfect place to prove it.

Robert Koehler

Gwangju Oct. 1, 2003