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When Seoul and Washington agree that the United States will hand over responsibility for certain areas of security in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area and outline the specific details and timeline for doing so, it shows how real the changes in our security climate are happening, and how rapidly.
Our concern is that the changes might be happening faster than Korea¡¯s ability to adjust to them. The military¡¯s initial position was that this should happen somewhere around the year 2010. Reports are that at the recent round of meetings, the United States strongly insisted that the transfer of responsibilities take place between 2004 and 2006, and there was little choice but to accept this.
The regular explanation about relocating USFK installations and transferring JSA responsibilities is that it¡¯s all just part of the Washington¡¯s new defense strategy in the wake of the terrorism of Sept. 11, 2001, one that includes a reorganizing of overseas bases and a greater reliance on lightweight, mobile cutting-edge technology. Korea had asked that the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division be moved south of the Han River only after the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved. When President Roh Moo-hyun visited the United States in May, he reportedly asked in earnest, but the first phase of this has essentially begun. The feeling you get is that all consideration for the reality of the Korean Peninsula has been pushed to the wayside, while the Washington's new strategy is forging ahead.
If the USFK moves away from the front lines, the duty of catching North Korean infiltrators and managing artillery operations and other responsibilities handled by the Americans will be left entirely to the Korean military. Aside from things like reactionary force capabilities, surveillance and command systems and equipment as well as more than a few other things will require prior preparation. Of extreme urgency will be making sure holes don¡¯t appear in our security by making up the differences in real and concrete ways.
Issues relating to security should never be pulled into ideological debates about intra-Korean or U.S.-Korean relations. The government urgently needs to examine what among the responsibilities carried out by the USFK can be assumed by Korea and engage in preparations for the changes to make sure there are no cracks in our security.
July 25, 2003
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