If you look at what has been made public about the US-Korea summit talks held Wednesday, you see signs that both sides have tried their best to keep their differences on North Korea from becoming more acute. Especially when compared to the awkward scenes from their meeting in March of last year, the way in which both presidents worked to achieve some harmony is by itself a meaningful achievement.
It was expected that the two would reaffirm the traditional US-Korea alliance, discuss the serious need for a solution to the issue of the North¡¯s weapons of mass destruction, and agree on the need for the solution to be achieved through dialogue. But there are aspects of the obvious outcome that are not all fully obvious, and they are an ironic portrait of the delicate situation on the Korean peninsula.
It is not difficult to find clear differences of approach to North Korea in the Cheong Wa Dae press conference and the speeches at Dorasan Station. President Bush did say that he fully supports the ¡°sunshine policy,¡± but he emphasized how he has been ¡°disappointed¡± at the way in which the North has so far failed to respond in kind, clearly noting the limits of sunshine policy. He talked of the repressive nature of the Kim Jong Il regime, and expressed his interest and concern for those who live under it, making it clear that the US will approach the regime and the population in a separate fashion. This is directly contrary to the basic mindset of sunshine policy, which seeks to encourage change in the Northern regime and an improvement in the lives of the people their through aid for the North Korean government.
In the end one would have to say that President Bush tried hard to appease the anti-American sentiments ignited by his ¡°axis of evil¡± comments, while at the same time making it perfectly clear that the standards of his policy towards the North were not about to change. Still, one result of the meeting appears to be that both allies confirmed that their common goal in policy towards North Korea will be encouraging change there, and that this will require strong cooperation in dealing with the North. When based on this common consensus, formulating concrete strategies for bringing the North back to the table for the sake of change and working towards mutual understanding should not be entirely too difficult.
One area left to be desired by this summit was more discussion on other important areas, such as economic issues, pushed aside by the problem of North Korea.
(February 21, 2002)
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