Both clarity and ambiguity can be important tools of diplomacy. But in using those tools, one must be conscious not just of the message one intends to send but also of the message that one's audience actually receives. If a distorted message is being received, then an adjustment may be necessary.

In his January 29th State of the Union speech, President Bush stated clearly that the U.S. “will not stand by” while potentially hostile states draw closer and closer to acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The unmistakable message was that it was unacceptable for such states to obtain WMD and that the Bush Administration would give top priority to preventing them from doing so.

The message was not just clear; it was also necessary. For several years, some members of the international community have grown complacent toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The impact of such proliferation, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, would be profoundly destabilizing. Yet supplier states such as Russia and China have not acted firmly to stop assistance from their counties to foreign nuclear and missile programs. And other states have begun to act as if they believed proliferation was a “fact of life” to which they had to adjust rather than a mortal danger which they had to prevent. President Bush's speech drew a clear line in the sand.

The question of how proliferation would be stopped, especially in the case of North Korea, was left ambiguous in the President's speech and in subsequent remarks by his advisers. On the one hand, the Administration has indicated a desire for diplomatic engagement by reiterating its readiness to meet with the DPRK anywhere, any time, and without preconditions. On the other hand, it has been careful not to rule out the use of pressure or even military force, and its strong rhetoric has raised questions about whether it genuinely wishes to engage with the DPRK.

Perhaps the Bush Administration is using this ambiguity as a diplomatic tool to create what it would regard as a more promising starting point for U.S.-DPRK negotiations. Under such a strategy, a tough but ambiguous message would signal that the U.S. will have high standards of success in any negotiation and that the Administration will have no patience for North Korea's past negotiating tactics (e.g., causing problems and then demanding a reward for resolving the problems). Above all, such a message would put Pyongyang on notice that the U.S. has options available to it other than the diplomatic option if North Korea is not prepared to negotiate in good faith to resolve outstanding issues.

Of course, it is difficult at this stage to know whether the strong words from Washington should be interpreted as a prelude to negotiations or as an indication that the Bush team does not believe it can do business with the North Korean regime. And there is a third alternative -- that the Administration has not yet made up its mind.

But if the Administration does intend to engage with North Korea (or at least wants to keep open the option for negotiation), it needs to be mindful of how its message is being received.

With a deeply suspicious and isolated government like North Korea's, there is a risk that the current ambiguous posture will be viewed not as an opening move in a tough negotiation but as a confirmation of its worst fear that the Bush Administration is implacably hostile towards the DPRK and unwilling to resolve problems in a way that takes DPRK interests into account. If North Koreans reach that conclusion, it will be very hard to get them to the negotiating table.

Another important audience is South Korea, its political leaders and its public. So far the Bush message has not gone over well. Even among South Koreans who share the Bush Administration's skepticism about DPRK intentions and believe engagement must be pursued in a more reciprocal and verifiable way, there is widespread resentment toward what is seen as inadequate sensitivity toward the core interests of a close Ally and inadequate appreciation of the requirements of stability on the Peninsula.

If the Bush Administration wants to increase prospects for negotiations with the North Koreans and to show the South Koreans that Washington is attentive toward their needs, it should fine tune its message, reducing some of the ambiguity that may have done more harm than good.

U.S. officials should start by toning down the rhetoric. They should also make clear that U.S. concerns are directed toward certain North Korean policies, not toward the North Korean people, and that if Pyongyang changes those policies, the U.S. will address legitimate DPRK concerns. Without ruling out any options, the Bush Administration should state clearly that diplomatic engagement is its preferred option and the one best suited to resolving the issues dividing North Korea and the United States. It should reiterate its offer to meet anywhere and any time, making absolutely clear that, while it will want to discuss certain topics (and assumes the DPRK will also wish to discuss certain topics), there should be no preconditions to sitting down together. And finally, it should give an unambiguous and non-ritualistic endorsement to North-South engagement and reconciliation.

South and North Koreans are already forming their own opinions of recent U.S. pronouncements about the Peninsula. If the Administration believes its message is not getting through, or is getting distorted, it will have no better opportunity to send the right message than President Bush's visit to Seoul next week.

(Senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program)