Biden's N.Korea Policy and Kim Jong-un's Silence

The Biden Administration has recently completed its policy review for North Korea, and so far the only thing that is clear is what it is not. It is neither about "strategic patience" as in the Obama administration's last few years nor about a "grand bargain" as in the Trump administration. But what it is remains unclear.

The term "strategic patience" was first coined by the late Stephen Bosworth when he said that the U.S. would be patiently waiting when North Korea emerged from its self-imposed isolation. This sounds on the surface like a policy posture open to diplomacy, but I think in practice it was actually the opposite. That is, after the failure of a 2012 deal in a dispute over whether North Korea's testing of a rocket in May constituted a violation of the short-lived agreement, the Obama administration focused on ramping up sanctions on Pyongyang in the hopes of causing enough pain to make it come to the negotiating table. Thus, strategic patience was the equivalent of maximum pressure.

The summit-level diplomacy pursued by Trump with Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019 still incorporated sanctions in the policy, but the focus was on achieving leader-to-leader commitments on denuclearization that would then filter down to be implemented by subordinates. It was a different approach in that it focused on "top-down" rather than "bottom-up" negotiations.

The Biden administration's new policy seems to sit somewhere between these two extremes, which is a good thing since neither of the extremes worked. On the contrary, the North's arsenal of bombs and delivery systems has only increased over the past dozen years. But what is the policy exactly?

Its goal remains denuclearization of North Korea. So, whatever interim steps Biden might take, there should be no mistaking it for a de facto acceptance of the North as a nuclear-armed state.

The policy's main platform is about the strength of alliances. This is an important departure from the previous administration in that Biden commits to not negotiating with North Korea over the heads of the allies, as Trump did by unilaterally surrendering joint military exercises with South Korea as a bargaining chip. This means a commitment to work with and through allies like Seoul and Tokyo in bilateral and trilateral consultations, which has been evident in the vigorous diplomacy in Asia thus far.

The policy seems to be open to negotiating moderate and incremental steps along the path to denuclearization, particularly if they are meaningful. By meaningful, we mean steps that halt further development, testing, and production, and that eventually roll back those activities in an irreversible manner.

It also appears that the Biden administration would be willing to put significant incentives on the table -- either bilaterally or with South Korea, and including sanctions relief and peace declarations -- if such steps on denuclearization were taken by the North. This does not mean a unilateral denuclearization by North Korea in return for sanctions relief, but more of a step-for-step approach.

The policy notably does not place a high level of emphasis on China's role in the U.S. strategy. This does not mean that there is a desire to freeze Beijing out, but it does reflect a realization that China's role in North Korea's denuclearization is limited, and the U.S. will not allow China to use the North Korea issue as leverage to pressure Washington in other areas. Ultimately, a grand bargain between the U.S., China and North Korea is not workable.

Finally, the policy does not rule out summit-level conversations, but places much greater emphasis on expert-level, bottom-up negotiations to achieve agreements that the two leaders could then bless.

These are, of course, my guesses at the substance of the policy. The irony is that it seems to be working. North Korea has remained unusually quiet. It has had a well-established practice of pressuring new administrations with provocations soon after they take office, annoying Obama and Trump only weeks after their inaugurations with long-range missile tests and nuclear tests. But aside from some projectile launches, we have not seen the fireworks emanating from Pyongyang after Biden's inauguration or in response to the May 21 summit with Moon. Why the silence from Pyongyang?

One theory is that Kim is practicing his own version of strategic patience. He has not responded to quiet entreaties by Seoul and Washington as a way of "raising the price" for his return to the dialogue table.

A second theory is that Pyongyang is waiting to see if Biden will demonstrate flexibility in the aftermath of the May 21 summit, and an early metric of that would be the type of military exercises that the alliance conducts in August. This is a more cautious approach given the failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019 which was embarrassing for Kim.

A third theory is that Kim is focused on internal economic problems, which he has openly admitted plague his country. This disincentivizes him from provocations that will draw global criticism, even from China.

A fourth theory is that the regime is distracted by the coronavirus pandemic. The fear of virus transmission has led to a 15-month lockdown of the border that has done more damage internally to the country than the toughest UN sanctions. Vaccines are still a long way off even with support from the UN-led COVAX Facility.

A fifth theory is that North Korean silence on the provocation front is actually a signal of interest in diplomacy.

A sixth and final theory is that North Korea's silence is the calm before the storm, and that we should brace ourselves for another round of provocations involving missiles and nuclear tests, including the demonstration of new advances in weaponry like submarine-launched ballistic missiles and more powerful, multi-warhead ICBMs. This last theory is most pessimistic but may be the most likely.