Cho Ho-jin

Korea's attempts to launch a satellite-carrying rocket into space are financed by W800 billion (US$1=W1,232) in taxpayers' money. But many areas of the Naro development project are questionable, and the telltale signs began to emerge in July last year.

The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology planned to launch the rocket into space on July 30 last year. The Naro consisted of a Russian-made first stage with an untested RD-151 engine as a booster and a Korean-made second stage mounted on top. The Korea Aerospace Research Institute has been overseeing production. On July 17, 2009, when KARI officials briefed reporters on the development timeline, it became apparent that the rocket had been assembled without testing of the Russian engine.

Assembling a rocket even from proven components can result in failure. It does not take, as it were, a rocket scientist to know that no untested components should be used. But KARI assembled the Naro with a Russian-made engine that had never been tested and pushed ahead with the first launch saying merely that such practices are "common" in space research.

The ministry's role has also been less than exemplary. The Naro's first launch failed when one of its fairings would not open and thus the satellite payload was ejected at the wrong time. The Naro was airborne for a total of nine minutes, and experts say it usually takes between 30 minutes to an hour for launch officials to determine a mission's failure. When Minister Ahn Byong-man conceded the mission's failure in a press conference an hour and 20 minutes after launch, he said the first and second-stage engines of the Naro operated normally but the satellite was not placed in the targeted orbit. He did not mention the fairing problem, but it was revealed later that he knew about it when he gave the press conference.

During the second launch earlier this month, KARI officials were 99 percent sure that the rocket exploded after it failed to relay signals back 137 seconds after blastoff. However, KARI President Lee Joo-jin announced officials would wait another two hours before reaching any conclusions about the fate of the mission. If broadcasters including KBS and SBS had not shown the Naro exploding, perhaps ministry officials would have tried to hide that information as well.

Still, Korea cannot give up on its space program, much as it cannot give up on research in stem cell technology just because cloning expert Hwang Woo-suk was disgraced when he was found to have fabricated his research findings. The important point is that covering up failures may avert immediate criticism but hinders progress. To ensure progress in the space program, the ministry and KARI must hide nothing when they probe the cause of the failure and the problems that existed at the developmental stage. They must admit their mistakes and take the necessary steps to improve apparent weaknesses in the program.

Cho Ho-jin from the Chosun Ilbo's News Desk