Ha Tae-kyoung

North Korea is stepping up provocations, preparing to fire a missile near the East Coast, refusing to recognize the Northern Limit Line, the de facto sea border, and restricting border crossings from the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex. What do North Korean citizens think about these provocations?

Many North Koreans now use Chinese mobile phones along the border with China, so their reactions are not that difficult to find out. But once the connection is established, North Koreans prove more curious to learn what is going on in the South. "Is South Korea preparing for war? Is that true?" they ask.

Preposterous though it may sound, North Koreans are given the impression that it is not the North that is provoking the South but the other way around. The North Korean authorities creating a war atmosphere by saying things like, "The traitor Lee Myung-bak and the puppet South Korean military have declared a preemptive attack against our republic" and that no one knows when a war will break out.

Pyongyang has succeeded in misleading the public that it was not North Korea but the United States and South Korea that started the Korean War, so it is no great leap to start false propaganda about the future. The problem is that North Koreans are denied other sources of information and therefore often believe their government.

This thoroughgoing information control provides the authorities with a sturdy background for their manipulation of inter-Korean relations. The North has the confidence that it can always gain political victories even in military defeats by the South. Following its defeat in the first Yeonpyeong Naval Battle of June 1999, the North publicized it "a victory that crushed an enemy provocation." Even when it cannot conceal a military defeat, the North is capable of controlling the public by publicizing that it was ambushed, and urging people to "sharpen the sword of revenge." The

South Korean government does not have that option. Even if only one or two soldiers are killed in a victorious military action, the opposition and civic groups will protest that lives have been sacrificed to the wrong North Korea policy. And the media slam the government for causing an economic downturn by failing to resolve tensions. In short, the South Korean government cannot win politically even if it wins militarily. The difference is that South Korea lives in the flood of information, while North Korea lives in a desert.

The first Gulf War offers another example of a military victory not leading to a political one due to such an asymmetric approach to information. In 1991, the U.S. drove Iraq out of Kuwait, but concluded the war without advancing to Iraq. Collin Powell, who commanded "Operation Desert Storm," stopped because he expected that Saddam Hussein, having been defeated in the war, would soon be deposed. But Saddam was left in complete control of information at home, and built a stronger base for his dictatorship.

The same applies to North Korea. To win a political victory over Kim Jong-il, the Lee administration must break the wall that blocks information. The EU and Reporters without Borders have recently decided to support private radio stations providing accurate information to North Koreans. The EU and the U.S. now participate in the campaign to convey accurate information to North Korean citizens. Only South Korea has yet to come on board.

The South Korean government must win the hearts of North Koreans by getting its point of view across to them. So long as Kim Jong-il monopolizes the eyes and ears of the North Koreans, Lee Myung-bak will sustain one political defeat after another even if he wins military victories.

By Ha Tae-kyoung, the president of Open Radio for North Korea